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This work comprises two volumes. Volume I contains two research 
papers on the topic of facial emotion processing in clinical 
populations. 
The first is a review of the literature on facial emotion processing in 
genetic neurodevelopmental syndromes. The second is an empirical 
study examining the relationship between structural MRI scans and 
facial emotion processing deficits in brain-damaged patients. 
Volume II contains five Clinical Practice Reports (CPRs) based on 
work conducted on clinical placements during Clinical Psychology 
training. CPR 1 (psychological models) presents the case of a 35-
year-old woman with symptoms of anxiety formulated from 
cognitive and systemic perspectives. CPR 2 (service evaluation) 
assessed client satisfaction and possible change over time in client 
characteristics within a Brief Therapy service. CPR 3 (single case 
design) evaluated the impact of an a tape-based intervention on 
mood and time spent sorting through belongings in a 77-year-old 
man with a hoarding problem. CPR4 presents a case study in which 
a cognitive-behavioural approach was employed in therapy with a 
15-year-old girl with Asperger’s Syndrome and selective mutism 
experiencing mood difficulties CPR5 was presented orally, and a 
single page summary is included here; this report described work 
carried out with a five-year-old girl with Smith-Magenis Syndrome 
displaying challenging behaviours. 
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Literature Review: Facial Emotion Processing in 






Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) are associated with atypicalities in the processing of 
emotion, including facial emotion, in others (e.g., Harms et al., 2010). Certain genetic 
neurodevelopmental syndromes are associated with an increased risk of ASD (e.g., Moss & 
Howlin, 2009). This literature review asks what is known about facial emotion processing in 
these syndromes, and how it might inform us about the relationship of the syndromes with 
ASD.  
A literature search was conducted for papers empirically assessing facial emotion 
processing in each of the five syndromes most frequently associated with ASD in the 
research literature (Moss & Howlin, 2009): Fragile X Syndrome, Tuberous Sclerosis 
Complex, Rett Syndrome, Down’s Syndrome and Phenylketonuria. Of these, studies were 
found, and reviewed, for Down’s Syndrome and Fragile X Syndrome. In DS, there is 
evidence of possible reduced accuracy, in relation to typically developing children of 
matched intellectual ability, in facial emotion processing tasks (e.g., requiring people to 
match faces by their emotion). However, any impairment may be subtle, and the nature of 
the deficit is not clear. In Fragile X Syndrome, there is no evidence of reduced accuracy in 
such tasks, but studies using eye tracking, pupillometry, and functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) indicate atypicalities in emotion processing. Possible 






Autism Spectrum Disorders and Facial Emotion Processing 
Atypical social interaction is one of the determining features of Autism Spectrum Disorders 
(ASD). Alongside communication problems and repetitive behaviours/restricted interests, 
difficulties with social interaction form one of the core “triad” of impairments (Wing, 1981) 
necessary for a diagnosis of ASD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Health 
Organization, 1992). Within this, differences in the processing of emotions in self and other 
are prominent. Kanner (1943) described autism as a “disorder of affective content” and 
Gillberg (1992) considered autistic disorders to be “empathy disorders”. DSM-IV-TR 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) diagnostic criteria include “lack of social or 
emotional reciprocity” and “marked impairments in the use of multiple nonverbal 
behaviours such as ... facial expression...”. ICD-10 (World Health Organisation, 1992) also 
specifies “a lack of socio-emotional reciprocity” and furthermore states that “There are 
always qualitative impairments in reciprocal social interaction. These take the form of an 
inadequate appreciation of socio-emotional cues, as shown by a lack of responses to other 
people’s emotions...”. Adaptive socialisation skills provide a key measure for diagnostic 
discrepancies in idiopathic ASD, for instance when the outcomes of the two gold-standard 
ASD assessments, the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 
1994) and Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (Lord et al., 2000), do not agree. 
Empirically, it has been frequently demonstrated that people diagnosed with ASD process 
other people’s facial emotion atypically (see Harms, Martin, & Wallace, 2010, for a review). 
Eye tracking, electrophysiological and brain imaging studies consistently indicate that 
people with ASD process facial emotion in an unusual way. For instance, Spezio, Adolphs, 
Hurley, & Piven (2007a; 2007b) found that people with ASD made more saccades away 
from the eyes of emotional faces, especially when the eyes portrayed important 
information; O’Connor, Hamm, & Kirk (2005) found certain event related potentials to be 
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delayed or diminished in people with ASD on presentation of emotional face stimuli; 
Ashwin, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, O’Riordan, & Bullmore (2007) report different 
amygdala reactivity to fearful faces in ASD. There have also been numerous 
demonstrations of impaired ability in explicit facial emotion processing tasks (e.g., Celani, 
Battacchi, & Arcidiacono, 1999; Tantam, Monaghan, Nicholson, & Stirling, 1989), although 
the evidence on this is somewhat more mixed (see Harms et al., 2010), perhaps partly due 
to variations in participant selection as well as methodology. Abnormalities in facial 
emotion processing may contribute to some of the hallmark features associated with an 
ASD diagnosis. 
Autism Spectrum Disorders and neurodevelopmental genetic syndromes 
The influence of genetics in the development of ASD is substantial: some estimates of 
heritability exceed 90% (Bailey et al., 1995; Szatmari et al., 2007). “Idiopathic” ASD appears 
to result from combinations of genetic (and environmental) factors (e.g., Abrahams & 
Geschwind, 2008). 
Of increasing recent interest in the academic literature are the relationships between 
known genetic causes of Intellectual Disability and the occurrence of ASD symptomatology 
(e.g., Meguid, 2012; Ji, Capone, & Kaufmann, 2011; Moss & Howlin, 2009; Moss, Howlin, 
Magiati, & Oliver, 2012). Intellectual disability in itself increases the risk of a diagnosis of 
ASD (e.g., Skuse, 2007). However, there is increasing evidence that certain intellectual 
disability-related genetic syndromes may be associated with a higher risk of ASD than 
expected based solely on their associated level of intellectual disability (see Moss & Howlin, 
2009; although see also Skuse, 2007). Furthermore it is, of course, possible to be diagnosed 
with ASD for many different sets of reasons, and an increasing body of evidence suggests 
that ASD within specific syndrome groups differs significantly from “idiopathic” ASD and 
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from ASD within other genetic syndrome groups (e.g., Moss, Howlin, Magiati, & Oliver, 
2012; Moss, Richards, Nelson, & Oliver, 2012). 
This begs the question: what are the specific psychological corollaries of syndromes which 
increase the probability of ASD diagnosis? And how might syndrome-related characteristics 
affect the nature of an ASD presentation in people with a specific syndrome? Answers to 
such questions could enrich our understanding of the psychological manifestations of 
specific genotypes, the nature and meaning of the ASD diagnostic category and, ultimately, 
our general understanding of normal and abnormal developmental trajectories. 
Facial Emotion Processing in ASD-associated Neurodevelopmental syndromes  
This literature review focuses on a crucial aspect of interpersonal functioning which has 
received theoretical and empirical research attention since Darwin (2005/1872): the 
recognition of facial emotions in others. As discussed in the previous two sections, 1) ASD is 
associated with difficulties/atypicalities in the processing of others’ facial emotion, and 2) 
certain genetic neurodevelopmental syndromes are associated with an increased 
probability of ASD. The review then asks the following questions: what do we know about 
the impact of ASD-associated genetic neurodevelopmental syndromes on the processing of 
facial emotion in others? How might this inform our understanding of the relationship 
between ASD and these syndromes? 
Paper selection for review 
Syndromes were selected for the literature search based on Moss and Howlin’s (2009) 
review paper. Moss and Howlin report the genetic syndromes most frequently cited as 
having an association with ASD, and the search focused on the “top 5” of these syndromes: 
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Fragile X Syndrome, Tuberous Sclerosis Complex, Rett Syndrome, Down Syndrome and 
Phenylketonuria1.  
For these five syndromes, a further search was conducted. The terms “face” OR “facial” 
AND “emotion” (consulting Harms et al., 2010, for corroboration of relevant search terms) 
were input into the Web of Science and PsychInfo search engines. In each case search 
engine this was combined, using the AND operator, with each of the five syndromes 
identified above. The abstracts of all returned papers were examined. Empirical studies to 
the end of the year 2011, in which the processing of facial emotion was experimentally 
assessed within the syndrome group, were selected for review. The reference sections of 
the returned papers were also examined, and further searches were performed for key 
authors (identified as above), to identify any papers which may have been missed in the 









                                                          
1 The search strategy of Moss and Howlin was informally repeated to confirm that there 
was no obvious change to these “top five” since 2009. 
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Syndrome Number of relevant 
papers to end of 2011. 
In title or as keyword: 




Details Additional papers 
identified (from 
reference lists of papers, 
etc). 
Fragile X Syndrome 
 
4 Dalton, Holsen, Abbeduto & 
Davidson (2008) 
 
Turk & Cornish (1998) 
 
Simon & Finucane, (1996) 
 
Hagan, Hoeft, Mackey, Mobbs & 
Reiss (2008) 
 
Farzin, Rivera & Hessl 
(2009) 
 
Farzin, Scaggs, Hervey, 




Johnstone, & Davidson 
(2008) 
 





0 - - 
Rett Syndrome 
 
0 - - 
Down’s Syndrome 
 
8 Fernández-Alcaraz, Extremera, 
García-Andres & Molina (2010) 
 
Hippolsyte, Barisnikov, & Van 
der Linden (2008) 
 
Hippolyte, Barisnikov, Van Der 
Linden, & Detraux (2009) 
 
Kasari, Freeman, & Hughes 
(2001) 
 
Porter, Coltheart, & Langdon 
(2007) 
 
Williams, Wishart, Pitcairn & 
Willis (2005) 
 
Wishart & Pitcairn (2000) 
 
Wishart, Cebula, Willis, & 
Pitcairn (2007) 
 






0 - - 
Table 1. Search outcomes 
Due to the lack of literature on facial emotion processing in Rett Syndrome, Tuberous 
Sclerosis Complex and Phenylketonuria, the following review addresses primarily research 
on two syndromes: Fragile X Syndrome and Down’s Syndrome. It focuses first on papers 
assessing facial emotion processing in Down’s Syndrome, and then in Fragile X Syndrome, 
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in each case considering the strength of evidence for, and nature of, potential atypicalities 
in the processing of facial emotion. In each case, the potential implications for the 
syndrome’s possible association with ASD are considered. 
Literature Review 
Facial Emotion Processing in Down’s Syndrome  
Down’s Syndrome (DS) is typically caused by full or partial trisomy of chromosome 21. 
Down’s Syndrome is the most common chromosomal cause of intellectual disability, 
occurring in approximately 10.3 in 10 000 live births (Bell, Rankin, & Donaldson, 2003) and 
accounts for the largest single grouping of children with intellectual disability of known 
aetiology. Down’s Syndrome is associated with mild to severe intellectual disability 
(Capone, Grados, Kaufmann, Bernad-Ripoll, & Jewell, 2005).  
In the past, co-occurrence of ASD and Down’s Syndrome was considered rare. A relative 
preservation of social skills has traditionally been thought to characterise Down’s 
Syndrome, the stereotype of which includes a sociable and friendly persona (Gibbs & 
Thorpe, 1983) not generally associated with ASD. However, more recently, research has 
indicated that co-morbidity of ASD within Down’s Syndrome may be more common than 
had been thought, with estimates of prevalence from 5% to 39% (see Moss and Howlin, 
2009; Moss et al., 2012). This has occurred alongside increased acknowledgment that 
people with Down’s Syndrome, despite being in some senses socially adept, may display 
disproportionate difficulty in certain areas of socio-cognitive understanding (e.g., Wishart, 
2007). For instance, it has been suggested that many superficially elaborate or charming 
behaviours may not be truly social in the sense that people with Down’s Syndrome may 
show little reciprocity in interactions (see Wishart & Pitcairn, 2000). This may contribute to, 
or otherwise affect, diagnoses of ASD in some people with Down’s Syndrome. The past 10-
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15 years have seen an increase in research with a social cognitive focus, with a number of 
papers directly testing the ability of children and adults with Down’s Syndrome to process 
emotion in the faces of others (see Table 2). 
Children 
Four studies (Kasari, Freeman, & Hughes, 2001; Wishart and Pitcairn, 2000; Williams et al., 
2005; Wishart et al., 2007) have directly assessed the ability of children with Down’s 
Syndrome to complete tasks requiring the matching, recognition or labelling of facial 
emotion, compared with control participants matched on other aspects of ability.  
One of the studies (Kasari et al., 2001) used felt puppets with detachable schematic 
emotional faces as stimuli, with the remaining three using facial photographs from the 
Ekman and Friesen series (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). The three studies which used 
photographic stimuli included a task in which participants had to match photographs (of 
differing identity) by their facial emotion (e.g., “This man looks sad. Can you find another 
picture [in a group of 3 pictures] of a man who looks sad?”; Williams et al., 2005). Wishart 
and Pitcairn (2000) and Kasari et al. (2001) also included a task requiring the explicit 
labelling of the emotion displayed on the stimulus (e.g., “this is a picture of Jim. Is Jim 
happy or angry?”; Wishart and Pitcairn, 2000). In Wishart and Pitcairn’s task, participants 
had the option of pointing to a schematic happy or angry face in response to this question. 
In addition, Kasari et al. (2001) used a receptive recognition task in which participants had 
to point to a stimulus displaying a specific emotion identified by the experimenter (“where 
is the [e.g., sad] face?”), and Kasari et al. (2001) and Wishart and Pitcairn (2000) included a 
task in which participants selected the appropriate emotion stimulus to match a story (e.g., 
a story about getting an ice cream on a hot day required the selection of the “happy” face 
stimulus). All six “basic” emotions (Ekman, Sorenson & Friesen, 1969; Ekman, 1992) – 
anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise – were assessed (in certain tasks) by 
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Wishart and Pitcairn (2000), Williams et al. (2005) and Wishart et al. (2007). These three 
papers also include non-emotional face-processing tasks (e.g., identity matching) to 
distinguish difficulties with recognising facial emotion from general problems with the 
processing of facial stimuli. 
Wishart and Pitcairn (2000), Williams et al. (2005) and Wishart et al. (2007) all found that 
participants with Down’s Syndrome performed significantly more poorly on the emotion-
matching tasks than did mental age-matched typically developing control participants. This 
difference remained significant when participants in one of the studies (Williams et al., 
2005) were matched for ability on a face recognition test. Wishart et al. (2007) also 
demonstrated no significant difference between Down’s Syndrome and typically 
developing groups on identity matching. The specific nature of the relative impairments 
varied slightly: Wishart and Pitcairn (2000) found that performance on fear and surprise 
was especially impaired, while Williams et al. (2005) and Wishart et al. (2007) note a 
particular problem with fear.  
Wishart and Pitcairn (2000) and Kasari et al. (2001) also found significantly worse 
performance on explicit expression recognition in children with Down’s Syndrome 
compared with typically developing children and, in Kasari et al.’s case, with children with 
non-specific intellectual disability. Kasari et al. (2001) found this difference in a sample of 
children with Down’s Syndrome of mean mental age 4.2 years (chronological age 6.4), but 
not in a younger sample with mean mental age 3.4 years (chronological age 8.1), suggesting 
that a relative impairment may emerge over time.  Consistent with this, Williams et al. 
(2005) found that, in contrast with their other two groups (typically developing and non-
specific intellectual disability), there was no significant effect of chronological age on 
emotion matching performance in Down’s Syndrome (adolescents up to 17 years of age 
were included in the study). 
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All four studies included a group of children with non-specific intellectual disability. Only 
Kasari et al. (2001) demonstrated significantly poorer performance of the Down’s 
Syndrome group in relation to the non-specific intellectual disability group, although the 
trends in the data in the other papers were in this direction. Wishart et al. (2007) suggest 
that, with small sample sizes, specific impairments in facial emotion processing in Down’s 
Syndrome may only be reliably demonstrable in relation to typically developing groups.  
Williams et al. (2005) found that there was less of a relationship between emotion 
matching and scores on other cognitive and linguistic assessment measures in the Down’s 
Syndrome group than in the other two groups. 
Whilst the authors of these studies generally suggest that the data indicate relatively 
specific deficits in the emotion processing tasks within the Down’s Syndrome group, there 
were some, albeit more limited, indications in some of these studies that performance on 
non-emotional face processing tasks was also poorer in Down’s Syndrome groups. Williams 
et al. (2005) found that the Down’s Syndrome group performed more poorly on the 
identity matching control task than the typically developing group, although they explain 
this in terms of attentional factors. 
Adults 
Three papers specifically assessed performance in facial emotion processing tasks in adults 
with Down’s Syndrome in relation to typically developing control participants (Hippolyte et 
al., 2008; Hippolyte et al., 2009; Fernandez-Alcaraz et al., 2010).  
Hippolyte and colleagues (2008; 2009) assessed facial emotion processing in adults with 
Down’s Syndrome compared with typically developing children matched on a measure of 
receptive vocabulary. Both papers used tasks involving receptive emotion identification and 
emotion matching. In a third task (Emotion Recognition and Intensity Attribution) 
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participants were presented with a series of face photographs and had to indicate whether 
each face was happy, sad or neutral (neither happy nor sad). For “happy” or “sad” 
responses, the participants then decide between 2 emotional intensity levels. The authors 
also included a non-emotional identity matching task. 
In neither study was there a significant difference between the control and Down’s 
Syndrome groups on identity matching. In both papers, the Down’s Syndrome group 
performed more poorly than the typically developing group on the receptive emotion 
identification and emotion matching tasks.  
On the Emotion Recognition and Intensity Judgment task, Down’s Syndrome groups in both 
years performed more poorly than the typically developing control participants. This was 
driven by particularly poor performance on identifying the neutral emotion. Analysis of 
errors indicated a bias towards more positive responses (happiness); this effect did not 
reach significance in the 2008 paper (although the effect size was medium to large), but 
Hippolyte et al. (2009) found a significant positive bias. 
Hippolyte et al. (2009) found that performance on a series of cognitive tasks, including 
receptive vocabulary, selective attention and non-verbal reasoning, correlated with aspects 
of the emotion processing tasks in the Down’s Syndrome group (as well as in controls). In 
particular, receptive vocabulary correlated with performance on the expression recognition 
task, with the relationship with the neutral expression being particularly strong.  
Fernández-Alcaraz et al. (2010) investigated the facial emotion processing skills of 20 adults 
with Down’s Syndrome and moderate intellectual disability and 20 typically developing 
controls matched for sex and chronological age. Four computer-administered face 
processing tasks were carried out: one identity-matching task and three requiring the 
processing of facial emotion. As would be expected on the basis of difference in intellectual 
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ability, the Down’s Syndrome group performed significantly more poorly on all tasks. 
However, the authors’ main aim was to determine whether the relative ease of the tasks 
was similar for the two groups. There is no breakdown of results by emotion, so more 
detailed analysis of the results is difficult. In addition, the paper does not include control 
participants of similar ability in other areas, so cannot assess the presence (or otherwise) of 
a specific deficit in facial emotion processing.  However, the paper broadly supports a 
position that there are similarities between the facial emotion processing of typically 
developing people and those with Down’s Syndrome. 
Adults and Children 
Porter et al. (2007) compared the emotion processing abilities of people with Down’s 
Syndrome and Williams Syndrome individually matched on gender, chronological age and 
mental age. Typically developing individuals matched to the Down’s Syndrome and 
Williams Syndrome groups on gender and chronological age were also tested, along with 
typically developing individuals matched to the Down’s Syndrome and Williams Syndrome 
groups on gender and mental age. Participants were given a forced-choice task in which a 
stimulus was presented and they had to indicate whether the expression in emotional faces 
and voices was happy, sad, angry or scared.  
Overall on emotion recognition (combined analysis of facial and vocal expressions), the 
Down’s Syndrome group were significantly out-performed by the Williams Syndrome group 
and both of the typically developing groups, with a statistically significant difference on 
sadness individually. Separate data for facial and vocal tasks are not presented, but there 
was some indication that the particular problems with the sad expression were more 
driven by the vocal than the facial tasks. Gagliardi et al. (2003) found that the recognition 
of facial emotion in Williams Syndrome is worse than that of chronological age-matched, 
but indistinguishable from that of mental age-matched, controls. Given that the Down’s 
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Syndrome and Williams Syndrome groups in Porter et al.’s (2007) study are matched on 
mental age, the findings are consistent with the notion that people with Down’s Syndrome 
have more difficulty with the processing of facial emotion than would generally be 
expected on the basis of their overall cognitive ability.  The authors note a positive bias in 
responses, with relative sparing of “happy”.  
Other related papers 
Certain papers intended to assess the facial affect recognition ability of people with ASD 
have used groups of people with Down’s Syndrome amongst their control participants. 
Celani, Battacchi, & Arcidiacono (1999) compared a group of children with ASD, a group of 
typically developing children and a group of Down’s Syndrome children, with all groups 
matched for Mental Age. Celani et al.’s (1999) Down’s Syndrome control group had a non-
significantly lower score than a verbal mental age-matched typically developing control 
group, and a significantly higher score than the verbal mental age-matched ASD group on a 
delayed matching-by-emotion task using the emotions happy, sad or “wry”.  
Turk and Cornish (1998) assessed facial emotion recognition in children with Fragile X 
Syndrome (discussed in more detail below), using IQ-matched people with Down’s 
Syndrome group as a control group. The Down’s Syndrome group performed more poorly 
on a task requiring participants to select a facial emotion to match a story. However, they 






Paper Emotions assessed 
 
Participants and matching Tasks Key (selected) findings for DS groups 
 







 14 boys FXS (CA 10.3; 
MA 5.7) 
 14 boys DS (CA 10.8; 
MA 5.1) 
 14 TD boys, MA-
matched (CA 6.1; MA 
6.2) 
 
DS and FXS matched on CA and 
MA 
 
Receptive identification of 
emotions 
 
Matching vocalisation to 
facial expression 
 





No differences on identification or matching of 
emotion.  
DS significantly lower scores than TD and FXS on 






DS lower scores than FXS and TD on face 
recognition 
 









All 6 “basic”  16 DS (mean CA 11.8) 
 
 23 TD similar MA (mean 
CA 4.1), matched on 
facial recognition task 
 
 16 NSID similar CA to DS 
group (mean 11.7) 
 
Matched on MA (DS and TD) or 




Match face to story 
 
Explicit labelling of facial 
emotion (angry or happy) 
 
 
Non-emotion face tasks 
DS impaired relative to TD on emotion matching, 
especially for fear and surprise.  
 





DS group impaired relative to TD on one non-
emotion task 
Kasari et al (2001) 
 
 












 20 DS (mean CA 6.4; 
mean MA 3.4) 
 20 TD, MA-matched 
 20 TD, CA-matched  
 
Study 2: 
 36 DS (mean CA 8.1; 
mean MA 4.2) 
 27 NSID, MA-matched 
 
All 3 studies: 
 





Select emotion match 
vignette 
 





Study 2: DS impaired relative to TD at expressive 
labelling and vignettes (significant for anger and 
fear). Impaired relative to TD and NSID on vignettes 
for anger and fear. 
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Paper Emotions assessed 
 





Kasari et al. 
(continued) 
 33 TD, MA-matched 
 
Matched on MA or CA 
 
 
Study 3 (follow-up): 
 16 DS from study 2, 2 








Study 3 (follow-up): lack of improvement 








All 6 “basic”  34 DS (mean CA 13.3; 
mean MA 4.3) 
 
 39 TD (mean CA 4.1; 
mean MA 4.4) 
 
 53 NSID (mean CA 11.8; 
mean MA 4.7) 
 
Matched on either MA or 
measure of non-emotional face 













DS worse than TD on emotion matching (most 
impaired on fear) 
 
 
DS worse than TD on identity matching (authors 

















Faces and voices 
 
 20 DS (CA 16.3; MA 4.7) 
 20 WS (CA 16.1; MA 
4.9) 
 20 TD (CA 15.9) 
 20 TD (CA 4.9; approx. 
MA-matching DS and 
WS) 
Receptive Emotion  
 
Identification (faces and 
voices), forced choice 
between 4 emotions 
 
DS outperformed by all other groups 
 
Particular deficit on sadness, although more driven 
by vocal than facial tasks 
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Paper Emotions assessed 
 
Participants and matching Tasks Key (selected) findings for DS groups 
   
DS matched on MA (to WS, TD) or 
CA (to second TD sample) 
 
Wishart et al. (2007) 
 
All 6 “basic” 
 
 15 DS (CA 13.4; MA 4.0) 
 15 FXS (CA 11.8; MA 
4.1) 
 15 NSID (CA 11.9; MA 
4.2) 
 15 TD (CA 4.0; MA 4.1) 
 


















No significant difference on identity matching 















 17 DS (mean CA 33.3) 
 17 TD (mean CA 5.9) 
 













Impairments in DS group on emotion matching and 




Impairments in DS group, especially on neutral 
expression. 
Positive emotion response bias (non-significant) 
 
 
Some indications of worse performance in DS 
group, but not significant. 
 








 24 DS (mean CA 34.3) 
 24 TD (mean CA 5.9) 
 






Impairments in DS group on emotion matching (all 
emotions impaired except surprise) and emotion 





Paper Emotions assessed 
 











Impairments in DS group, especially on neutral 
expression. 
Positive emotion response bias (significant) 
 
No significant group differences 
 
Fernandez-Alcaraz 



















 20 DS 
 20 TD  
 
Matched on sex and CA (not on 









Facial identity discrimination 
 
 
DS group poorer performance all tasks (note groups 
not matched on performance measure) 
 
Same order of ease of tasks in both groups 
 
Table 2. Key characteristics of papers on facial emotion recognition in DS. Abbreviations: FXS = Fragile X Syndrome; DS = Down’s Syndrome; WS = Williams Syndrome; TD = Typically 
Developing; MA = Mental Age; CA = chronological age; NSID = non-specific intellectual disability; fMRI = functional magnetic resonance imaging. See main text for further details (e.g., of 




Summary: Facial Emotion Processing in Down’s Syndrome 
Papers published over the last 10-15 years have presented evidence that both children and 
adults with Down’s Syndrome, relative to typically developing control participants of similar 
ability in other domains, may be impaired in tasks which explicitly require the processing of 
facial emotion, including matching pictures by emotion (e.g., Williams et al., 2005; Wishart et 
al., 2007; Hippolyte et al., 2008, 2009), labelling the emotion in facial stimuli receptively (e.g., 
Kasari et al., 2001; Porter et al., 2007) and expressively (e.g., Kasari et al., 2001), and matching 
facial emotion to story vignettes (e.g., Turk and Cornish, 1998; Wishart and Pitcairn, 2000). 
Many tasks used within this research have been designed to minimize linguistic and other 
cognitive requirements (see, e.g., Wishart et al., 2007) and there is some evidence to indicate 
that the difficulties are relatively specific and not entirely accounted for by general intellectual 
or linguistic factors (e.g., Wishart et al., 2007; Hippolyte et al., 2008) or general face-
processing difficulties (e.g., Williams et al., 2005). There is some indication (e.g., Williams et 
al., 2005) that performance in facial emotion processing tasks is less correlated with other 
aspects of ability in Down’s Syndrome than in other groups. However, other studies have 
found different cognitive abilities, such as receptive vocabulary and selective attention, to 
correlate strongly with performance on the emotion processing tasks (Hippolyte et al., 2009).  
The conclusion that there are specific impairments in Down’s Syndrome on facial emotion 
processing tasks must currently be drawn only tentatively. In a number of the studies, there 
remains the confound associated with a “task dissociation” paradigm (see Jacoby, 1991, for a 
discussion and general possible solution). It is possible that the control tasks are simply less 
sensitive to performance deficits than the emotion processing tasks (e.g., Wishart et al., 2007; 
Williams et al., 2005; Wishart and Pitcairn, 2000), so the specificity of the possible facial 
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emotion processing difficulties remains partly an open question. The conclusion that there is a 
specific facial emotion processing deficit in Down’s Syndrome would have been strengthened 
had it been statistically demonstrated that the discrepancy in performance on emotional and 
non-emotional tasks was different across the groups. However, such analyses were not 
undertaken.  
Several studies demonstrated poor performance by people with Down’s Syndrome on facial 
emotion processing tasks in relation to typically developing children matched for ability in 
other areas (e.g., Williams et al., 2005; Wishart et al., 2007). However, the evidence for 
impairment in relation to people with non-specific intellectual disability is weaker.  
The specific nature of any impairment in facial emotion processing with respect to specific 
emotions is not consistent across the reviewed studies. The use of different sets of emotions 
in different studies also makes it hard to draw general conclusions. Some researchers 
(Hippolyte et al., 2008; 2009; Porter et al., 2007) note a possible bias towards mistaking 
negative emotions for more positive ones. There was also a possible problem with identifying 
emotionally neutral faces, although this could have been partially related to linguistic 
demands (Hippolyte et al., 2009). This is particularly interesting in relation to a study by 
Conrad et al. (2007), who conducted an EEG study of a small number of children with and 
without Down’s Syndrome while they watched video clips of differing affective content. There 
was evidence that, for happy, fearful and sad video clips, the Down’s Syndrome group 
displayed more intense emotional reactivity, which might be taken to indicate a bias away 
from emotional neutrality.  
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Down’s Syndrome, facial emotion processing, and Autistic Spectrum 
Disorders 
How does an understanding of facial emotion processing in Down’s Syndrome alter our 
understanding of the ways ASD might present in people with Down’s Syndrome? Overall, 
evidence points to a (perhaps subtle) possible difficulty, relative to others of similar ability in 
other areas, with the processing of facial emotion in people with Down’s Syndrome. This has 
yet to be fully characterised. To the extent to which the possible deficit impacts on the social 
functioning of individuals with Down’s Syndrome, it may affect 1) the probability that people 
with Down’s Syndrome are diagnosed with ASD, and 2) the manner in which ASD might 
present. 
Examination of diagnostic criteria for ASD (e.g., DSM-IV; ICD-10) indicate that diminished 
understanding of others’ facial expressions – as it seems may be the case in Down’s Syndrome 
– can contribute to a diagnosis of ASD. An impoverished understanding of facial emotion in 
people with Down’s Syndrome (over and above that explained by the level of intellectual 
disability) may increase the likelihood that a person with Down’s Syndrome will be diagnosed 
with ASD. To my knowledge, this remains a largely untested notion. No studies were found 
relating facial emotion processing difficulties to ASD symptomatology. In Down’s Syndrome, 
the manner in which impaired emotion-processing ability in Down’s Syndrome might interact 
with other factors – related and unrelated to Down’s Syndrome – remains to be elucidated. 
Numerous other factors (linguistic and other communicative abilities, social motivation, 
interests, and so on) would presumably interact with any facial expression perception 
difficulties to determine the overall manner in which the person presents. And this 
presentation, in turn, is in practice key to whether an individual will ultimately gain a diagnosis 
of ASD. For example, should a bias to interpret others’ emotions as more positive than they 
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are (Hippolyte et al., 2008; 2009) influence the real-world social interactions of people with 
Down’s Syndrome, one might imagine that this might contribute to the relatively 
indiscriminate social approach behaviour noted in the syndrome (although Porter et al., 2007, 
found no evidence of abnormal approach ratings alongside deficits in negative emotion 
recognition in their Down’s Syndrome group). It is conceivable that this could either increase 
or decrease the probability of being diagnosed with ASD depending on the context of other 
features of an individual. If approach behaviours present as extreme sociability, for instance, 
they may reduce the likelihood that clinicians and others would consider ASD as a diagnosis for 
an individual. If, on the other hand, the social insensitivity of the social approaches 
predominates in the impression given by the person, this could increase the likelihood of an 
ASD diagnosis.  
Empirically, there is little evidence to elucidate a possible role for diminished facial expression 
in determining which people with Down’s Syndrome will obtain a diagnosis of ASD. Capone 
and colleagues’ analysis (Capone et al., 2005; Carter, Capone, Gray, Cox, & Kaufmann, 2007) 
did not indicate a strong role for social factors, more generally, in distinguishing people with 
Down’s Syndrome and ASD from those with Down’s Syndrome and no comorbid behaviour 
disorder. They instead found that unusual stereotypy and anxious behaviour were the main 
distinguishing variables. However, social withdrawal played a significant role in differentiating 
those with Down’s Syndrome-ASD from those with Down’s Syndrome and Stereotypic 
Movement Disorder (although Moss et al., 2012, found people with Down’s Syndrome and 
ASD may be less socially withdrawn than those with idiopathic ASD). The relationship between 
characteristics such as social withdrawal and facial emotion processing abilities has not been 
assessed in Down’s Syndrome.  
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Even if facial emotion processing abilities do not contribute to determining which people with 
Down’s Syndrome will also have ASD, it is possible that a facial emotion processing difficulty 
influences what ASD looks like when in combination with Down’s Syndrome. Whether, and in 
what way, this might be the case remains largely a question for future research. Interestingly, 
Turk and Cornish’s (1998) paper informs that, of five participants with ASD and Down’s 
Syndrome, parental reports indicated that 3 of the children showed “no understanding” of 
facial expression. This compares to 0 of 5 boys with ASD and Fragile X Syndrome and 6 of 18 
boys with idiopathic ASD. This would be consistent with the notion that impaired facial 
emotion processing characterises ASD in Down’s Syndrome, although this is of course a small 
sample size, and also relies on parent report measures which are subject to reporting biases. 
The manner in which impaired ability to recognise others’ emotions may impact on this is not 
clear.  
Facial emotion processing in Fragile X Syndrome 
Fragile X Syndrome occurs in 1 in 3600 males and 1 in 8000 females, making it the most 
common known inherited cause of intellectual disability (Cornish et al., 2008). It arises from an 
excessive number (>200) of CGG repeats within the Fragile X Mental Retardation-1 (FMR1) 
gene, location Xq27-3. 5-40 repeats is classified as normal, 45-54 as an intermediate or grey 
zone, 55-200 as a pre-mutation and >200 as the full mutation (Maddalena et al., 2001). People 
with Fragile X Syndrome have lower levels of the FMR protein (encoded by the FMR1 gene), 
which has a cascade of developmental consequences. Fragile X Syndrome is generally 
associated with moderate to severe intellectual disability in males, with more variable (and 
generally less severe) intellectual disability found in females (Freund & Reiss, 1991; Reiss & 
Dant, 2003). Hyperactivity, attention deficits and social anxiety have also been associated with 
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Fragile X Syndrome (e.g., Reiss & Dant, 2003). Recent studies estimate the prevalence of 
diagnosable ASD in Fragile X Syndrome to be between 21% and 50% (although this is likely to 
be lower in females, Mazzocco, Kates, Baumgardner, Freund, & Reiss, 1997). In comparison 
with other known genetic neurodevelopmental syndromes (including Down’s Syndrome), the 
association between Fragile X Syndrome and ASD has been relatively well studied. The 
behavioural phenotype of Fragile X Syndrome is generally thought to share characteristics with 
idiopathic ASD.  
Table 3 gives basic details of key studies on facial emotion processing in Fragile X Syndrome. 
Table 4 summarises key functional imaging findings where relevant.  
Initial behavioural studies 
Behavioural studies have found little indication of a deficit in facial emotion processing in 
Fragile X Syndrome. Mazzocco et al. (1994) assessed the ability of 46 females with the fragile X 
mutation (both unaffected carrier and expressing females) to match facial emotions, 
comparing their performance to that of a group of typically developing females. Performance 
was positively related to IQ but not to Fragile X Syndrome status.  
Simon and Finucane (1996) assessed the ability of 15 adult males with Fragile X Syndrome and 
15 individually age- and IQ- matched controls to identify facial expressions. Participants were 
shown a series of 48 pages of 6 faces, each displaying one of the “basic” six emotions, and 
were asked to point to a face displaying the emotion identified by the experimenter. There 
was no significant difference in emotion recognition between the two groups; neither was 
there any evidence that the relative difficulty of the different emotions differed. Wishart et 
al.’s (2007) study (discussed above) also indicated no impairments in facial emotion processing 
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tasks in an Fragile X Syndrome group, relative to matched typically developing, non-specific 
intellectual disability and Down’s Syndrome participants. 
Turk and Cornish’s (1998) first study assessed the facial emotion processing of 14 boys with 
Fragile X Syndrome (none of whom had received a diagnosis of autism), 14 boys with Down’s 
Syndrome matched on age and IQ, and 14 typically developing boys matched on IQ (and 
therefore with a lower chronological age). Children completed three facial emotion processing 
tasks (receptive emotion identification, matching a schematic face to an emotional noise such 
as sobbing, and selecting an emotional face to match a story vignette) and a facial recognition 
task. In none of these tasks was there a significant difference between the Fragile X Syndrome 
and typically developing groups’ performance. In a second study, 18 boys with Fragile X 
Syndrome, 45 boys with Down’s Syndrome and 42 with non-specific intellectual disability, 
matched on chronological age, were rated using a semi-structured interview with parents 
(Wing, 1980). One item reads: “How much can you control his behaviour by your facial 
expression without saying anything?”, to which a parent could respond that their child 
displayed no understanding of facial expression (score 0), that behaviour could be controlled 
by exaggerated expressions (score 1) or that behaviour could be controlled by small changes in 
facial expression (score 2). Although there were no significant differences between groups, it 
was noted that no boy with Fragile X Syndrome scored 0, whilst 20% of the Down’s Syndrome 
group and 16% of the non-specific intellectual disability group fell into this category. Two-
thirds of the Fragile X Syndrome group demonstrated good understanding, whereas this was 
true of fewer than half of the Down’s Syndrome and non-specific intellectual disability groups. 
Over the three groups, participants with ASD were significantly more likely to show “no 
understanding” of facial expression than participants without ASD. None of the 5 boys with 
ASD and Fragile X Syndrome showed no understanding of facial expression, while 3 of 5 of the 
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Down’s Syndrome-ASD group and 6 of the 18 ASD-non-specific intellectual disability group 
showed no understanding. 
Pupillary Response (Autonomic Activity) 
Two recent studies have assessed autonomic activity, as indexed by pupillary dilation, in 
response to facial emotion in Fragile X Syndrome. Farzin et al. (2009) assessed 16 individuals 
with Fragile X Syndrome and 16 typically developing individuals matched for chronological age. 
Of the Fragile X Syndrome group, 8 were diagnosed with ASD. Farzin et al. (2011) used the 
same stimuli and experimental procedure to assess 15 individuals with Fragile X Syndrome and 
20 typically developing controls, group-matched on chronological age. In this study, 
participants were tested twice, no more than two weeks apart.  
Participants passively viewed 60 colour photographs of adult human faces each displaying a 
calm, happy or fearful expression. Each face was displayed for 3 seconds (preceded by a 
scrambled image of the face), during which participants’ eye movements and pupil diameter 
were recorded. Farzin et al (2009) found that participants in the Fragile X Syndrome group 
made fewer fixations, and spent less time looking at, the eye region of the faces. Also, 
participants with Fragile X Syndrome displayed greater pupil reactivity to emotional faces, 
compared with controls. Both groups showed most pupillary reactivity to the happy and 
fearful faces. In the Fragile X Syndrome group, pupil dilation in response to fearful faces 
correlated inversely with the number of fixations to the eyes of calm, happy and fearful faces.  
Farzin et al. (2011) aimed to assess the feasibility and reliability of eye tracking and 
pupillometry as an outcome measure for evaluation of pharmacological interventions in 
Fragile X Syndrome. Their study confirmed Farzin et al.’s findings (2009) of significant 
differences in fixations and looking time for different facial regions between groups. For 
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instance, individuals with Fragile X Syndrome made significantly fewer fixations to the eye 
region of all faces. They also replicated the finding that participants with Fragile X Syndrome 
displayed greater pupillary reactivity than the typically developing group to faces in general 
(although they did not report an association of this effect with the emotion displayed on the 
face). Fixation count, looking time and pupillary response measures were all highly reliable 
across sessions.  
The authors postulated that, during social interaction, people with Fragile X Syndrome - “both 
with and without autism” - experience excessive emotional arousal, which they then try to 
reduce using gaze aversion. The studies are, overall, consistent with the notion that increased 
autonomic arousal in response to emotion in others’ faces characterises Fragile X Syndrome. 
The impact of the specific emotion displayed remains to be elucidated (see also Hagan et al., 
2008). In addition, the relationship of autonomic arousal with other cognitive, emotional and 
behavioural factors needs further exploration.  
Functional neuroimaging studies 
Two studies (Dalton et al., 2008; Hagan et al., 2008) have used fMRI to record brain activation 
during tasks in which participants made judgments about the emotional status of facial 
photographs. Dalton et al. (2008) compared people with Fragile X Syndrome with individuals 
with ASD and typically developing people. Hagan et al. (2008) compared females with Fragile X 
Syndrome with females. Different sets of emotions were assessed in the two papers, with 
different sets of response options. Dalton et al (2008) presented participants with happy, 
angry, fearful and neutral faces, and participants had to decide whether each face was 
“emotional” or “neutral” and respond with a corresponding button press. They also tracked 
participants’ eye movements. Hagan et al. (2008) presented happy, sad, neutral and 
28 
 
scrambled faces, to which participants responded (via a button press) “happy” (left button), 
“sad” (middle button) or “neutral or scrambled” (right button).  Hagan et al. (2008) made 
comparisons, between the two groups of participants, of brain activation maps representing 
specific contrasts between different types of stimuli. For example, typically developing and 
Fragile X Syndrome groups were compared in their activation for “happy faces minus neutral 
faces”. This contrast presumably represents the activation specifically attributable to a (happy) 
emotional expression. In addition, the groups were compared in their activation for (e.g.) 
“happy minus scrambled” faces, a contrast which presumably represents not only the specific 
emotional expression but also the effect of “faceness”. Holsen et al. (2008) also conducted a 
study of participants with Fragile X Syndrome (5 male) during the presentation of fearful faces; 
participants judged whether each face was male or female. The authors conducted fMRI brain 
scanning, and compared activation maps of the Fragile X Syndrome group to those of a 
typically developing group matched on age, gender and handedness. 
Overall, fMRI studies indicated neural atypicalities in the processing of emotional faces in 
Fragile X Syndrome (see Table 4 for details). Hagan et al.’s (2008) study suggested that, in 
females with Fragile X Syndrome (relative to age-matched typically developing females), there 
may be emotion-specific differences in face processing. In particular, in the Fragile X Syndrome 
group happy faces elicited greater activity in certain brain areas associated with emotion 
processing, while sad faces elicited less activation than was found in controls. In Dalton et al.’s 
study, people with Fragile X Syndrome displayed differences in brain activation and eye 
movements when processing facial stimuli, with some of the atypicalities shared by a group of 
people with ASD (e.g., Fusiform Gyrus, FG, hypoactivation) and some not. Regions which were 
especially active in the Fragile X Syndrome group included the left postcentral gyrus and right 
insula (both also especially active in response to happy faces in Hagan et al’s study). However, 
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these differences in Dalton et al.’s study were not related to the specific emotional status of 
the faces. Holsen et al.’s (2008) study indicated that possible regions of left and right frontal 
cortex may function differently in relation to social anxiety in people with Fragile X Syndrome. 
The manner in which this might relate to different facial emotions is unclear as only fearful 
faces were displayed.  
The psychological interpretation of fMRI activation data is tricky (perhaps especially in people 
in whom brain development may be atypical), and there are many potential alternative ways 
to account for physiological data at a conceptual level. For instance, syndrome-specific 
activation patterns in the hippocampus (Dalton et al., 2008) may relate to numerous 
alternative emotion and/or memory functions. Hagan et al.’s study provides the most 
systematic investigation of activation in relation to different emotions (albeit it only happy, 
sad and neutral), and its power to do this was limited by a relatively short interstimulus 
interval (mean 1572ms). Overall, however, the studies add to the position that the emotional 
response to emotional and non-emotional faces may be atypical in Fragile X Syndrome. Brain 
activation data may be taken as consistent with the notion that, at least for some facial 
emotions, people with Fragile X Syndrome may respond with particularly pronounced 
emotional arousal (Dalton et al., 2008; Hagan et al., 2008). Hagan et al.’s study also raises the 
possibility that for sadness (an emotion not assessed by Dalton et al., 2008 or Farzin et al., 
2009; 2011, see below) people with Fragile X Syndrome are less emotionally aroused than are 
typically developing people. There are also indications that the neural correlates of social 




Paper Participants and matching Emotions included Measures 
Key findings (non-fMRI) for FXS 
group 





 56 control (TD) 
women (CA 31.3) 
 27 women carrying 
FXS premutation 
(CA 33.9) 
 19 women carrying 
full mutation (CA 
30.5) 
 













Emotion matching No significant group differences in 
accuracy 
 





 15 FXS adults (all male. 
Mean CA 41.8) 
 
 15 “non-FXS” adults 
(NSID?) (all male. Mean 
CA 43.5) 
 












Paper Participants and matching Emotions included Measures 
Key findings (non-fMRI) for FXS 
group 
 




 14 males FXS (CA 10.3; 
MA 5.7) 
 14 males DS (CA 10.8; 
MA 5.1) 
 14 TD males (CA 6.1; MA 
6.2) 
 











to facial expression 
 
Match facial expression 







No significant differences between 




FXS superior performance to DS in 
some tasks (see Table 2) 
Dalton et al (2008) 
 
 9 FXS (6 female, 3 male. 
None with clinical 
diagnosis ASD. Mean CA 
20.7. Mean IQ 66.1) 
 
 14 ASD (all male. Mean 
CA 15.9.Mean IQ 87.2) 
 
 15 TD (3 female, 12 
male. Mean CA 16.8) 
 
Not closely matched on CA, 
or on gender.  
Groups not matched on IQ 



















Behavioural: accuracy of FXS and ASD 
groups similar  
 
Eye data: marginal tendency for FXS 
group to look less at the eyes than 
the TD group (no difference between 
ASD and FXS).  
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Paper Participants and matching Emotions included Measures 


















 10 FXS (all female. Mean 
CA 16.4. Mean IQ 91) 
 
 10 TD females (mean CA 
15.6. Mean IQ 106) 
 
Groups matched for CA and 














Behavioural Task: 3 
button press – happy 
(left button), sad 
(middle button), neutral 









Behavioural: FXS lower accuracy 














 11 FXS (6 females, 5 
males. Mean CA 18.5) 
 
 11 TD (6 females, 5 
males. Mean CA 18.7)  
 

















Different relationships between 
measures of social anxiety and brain 
activation for the different groups 
(see Table 4) 
 








 16 FXS (3 females, 13 
males. Mean CA 17.0) 
 16 TD (3 females, 13 
males. Mean CA 17.1) 
 








Eye tracking and 
pupillometry 
 
FXS greater pupillary reactivity to 
emotional faces 
 
FXS group: Pupillary response to 
fearful faces inversely correlates with 




Paper Participants and matching Emotions included Measures 









 15 FXS (3 females, 12 
males. Mean CA 18.8) 
 
 20 TD (10 females, 10 
males. Mean CA 24.9) 
 









Eye tracking and 
pupillometry 
 




 Table 3. Key details of papers on facial emotion recognition and FXS (see Table 4 for neuroimaging findings). Abbreviations: FXS = Fragile X Syndrome; TD = Typically Developing;  MA = 
Mental Age; CA = chronological age; NSID = non-specific intellectual disability; fMRI = functional magnetic resonance imaging. See main text for further details (e.g., of tasks). Gender of 










Key fMRI findings for FXS group Possible interpretations (base d  on suggestions of 
authors) 
Further notes/comments 







4 regions great activation for FXS 
than other groups: 
 
 Left hippocampus 
(correlated with SCQ) 
 
 Right insula 
 
 




 Left  postcentral gyrus 
 
 
Hypoactivation of left FG compared 
with TD (in common with ASD).  
 
FXS group: fixations to eye region 
correlate positively with FG 
activation. 
 
Activation in right FG correlates 
negatively with SCQ score (i.e., 
greater endorsement of ASD features 
= lower FG activation) 
 
Activation of left amygdala correlates 





 Reduced habituation to emotionally salient 
stimuli? 
 
 Increased anxiety/orienting to emotional 
faces? 
 
 Compensatory brain activity specific to the 
fear emotion? 
 
 Enhanced cortical motor response? 
 
 
Neural mechanisms in common with ASD 
 
 
Specific FXS-related relationship between behavioural  
features and FG activation 
 
 
Relationship between ASD symptomatology and FG 




Specific relationship between amygdala and ASD 
symptomatology   
 
 
ASD data included for comparison 
 
ASD symptomatology assessed in FXS 
group in relation to fMRI data 
 
Not possible to determine which 


















Sad minus neutral faces: 
 
FXS lower activation in parts of the 




Sad minus scrambled faces: 
 
Lower activation in left claustrum, 
putamen and caudate and left 
superior and middle frontal gyri 
 
 
Happy minus neutral faces:  
 
FXS group increased activation in 
certain areas, including the 
precentral gyrus, right middle frontal 
gyrus and right insula 
 
Dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
(dACC): FMRP levels correlated 
positively with activation (although 
when IQ was covaried out, the 
correlation remained significant only 









Lower emotional arousal in FXS in response to 
















Biochemical evidence for modulation by FXS genetics 




Specifically assesses correlates of 
processing emotion in faces 
 


















For faces which were later 
remembered:  
In regions of left and right frontal 
cortex, higher brain activation 
associated with lower social anxiety. 
Opposite correlation observed in 
control participants. 
 
Lower activation of prefrontal 





Specific neural mechanisms behind social anxiety in 
FXS 
 
Social cognition networks activated alongside social 










Behavioural task not emotion-related 
 
Not possible to determine which 




Table 4. fMRI findings for facial emotion processing in FXS (see Table 3 for other aspects of papers). Abbreviations: FXS = Fragile X Syndrome; SCQ = 
Social Communication Questionnaire (Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003); FG = Fusiform Gyrus; TD = Typically Developing; dACC = dorsal Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex; FMRP = Fragile X Mental Retardation Protein; fMRI = functional magnetic resonance imaging. 





Facial Emotion Processing in Fragile X Syndrome: What can we learn 
about the ASD association? 
Task Accuracy 
There is little indication in the reviewed literature that accuracy in explicit facial emotion 
processing tasks (e.g., receptive identification of emotion, Turk and Cornish, 1998, Simon and 
Finucane, 1996;  matching pictures by emotion, Wishart et al., 2007; selecting facial emotion 
pictures based on a story, Turk and Cornish, 1998) is specifically impaired in Fragile X 
Syndrome.  
In idiopathic ASD, whilst the evidence is mixed (see Harms et al, 2010, for a review), it has long 
been considered that there may be specific impairments in performance on emotion-
processing tasks such as matching pictures by emotion (Bormann-Kischkel, Vilsmeier & Baude, 
1995; Hobson, 1986; Lindner & Rosén, 2006, and numerous others). Based on current 
evidence (albeit following less investigation), there are no such deficits in these tasks in Fragile 
X Syndrome populations.  
What might this tell us about the relationship between ASD and Fragile X Syndrome? There 
are few studies of facial emotion processing specifically in people with comorbid Fragile X 
Syndrome and ASD (although see Dalton et al., 2008; Farzin et al., 2009). However, the 
apparent absence of impairment in facial emotion processing tasks in Fragile X Syndrome 
overall may be consistent with the notion that people with Fragile X Syndrome-ASD have social 
skills which are less impaired than in people with idiopathic ASD (e.g., Kau et al., 2004). This 
picture is complicated by the results of studies indicating that within groups of people with 
Fragile X Syndrome, it is socialisation skills which seem to best predict ASD diagnosis. 
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Kaufmann et al. (2004) assessed boys with Fragile X Syndrome with and without ASD, and 
concluded that it was Reciprocal Social Interaction domain of the Autism Diagnostic Interview-
Revised (ADI-R) (Lord et al., 1994) which formed the main distinction between the groups of 
participants. Facial emotion processing is a key component of effective reciprocal social 
interaction. The socialisation scale of the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scales (VABS; Sparrow, 
Balla, & Cicchetti, 1984) was also a strong predictor of ADI-R score. Budimirovic et al. (2006) 
also found that 6 items on the VABS socialisation scale accounted for the correlation between 
this scale and ASD diagnosis, and revealed that these items represented recognition of 
emotions and verbal labelling of emotions (e.g., “label happiness, sadness, fear and anger in 
oneself”; “respond appropriately when introduced to others”) and the recognition and 
application of rules of social behaviour. Such abilities may well be related to facial emotion 
processing skills, although it is possible that deficits as reported on these questionnaires are 
assessing different or additional abilities from those assessed in empirical studies of emotion 
processing. At present there is no evidence that facial emotion processing abilities as 
measured empirically are correlated with ASD symptomatology in Fragile X Syndrome. The 
relationship between questionnaire measures of facial emotion processing and empirical 
investigations of the ability may need to be assessed. For instance, it is possible that an IQ-
appropriate ability to recognise emotions within an experimental setting does not translate 
into a socially appropriate use of this ability. 
Autonomic Arousal and Eye movements 
Whilst behavioural performance on facial emotion processing tasks is not obviously impaired, 
the manner in which emotion in faces is processed does appear to be atypical within Fragile X 
Syndrome populations.  
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First, people with Fragile X Syndrome may show a greater autonomic response to at least 
some emotions when displayed on other people’s faces, which in turn may affect their 
behaviour (Farzin et al., 2009). In particular, it may be that in order to regulate this autonomic 
response, there is a tendency to avert gaze from faces, especially from the eye region. 
Intuitively, it seems likely that a characteristic associated with the avoidance of eye contact 
might, all other things being equal, increase the likelihood of a person being diagnosed with 
ASD. It is therefore intriguing that, in Farzin et al.’s study, there were no significant 
associations between symptoms of ASD (measured by the SCQ and ADOS) with any of the 
fixation, dwell time or pupil reactivity measures. It is possible that Farzin et al.’s finding of a 
lack of relationship between eye fixations and ASD symptoms reflects that people with Fragile 
X Syndrome in their sample all, or almost all, display enough gaze avoidance for this to 
potentially classify as characteristic of ASD. Therefore, variance in ASD measures would be 
more substantially related to other aspects of ASD symptomatology: whether or not a person 
with Fragile X Syndrome also has a diagnosis of ASD could depend on other, more variable, 
characteristics (e.g., communication skills). If this were the case, the autonomic arousal 
associated with processing others’ facial emotions could be a factor linking Fragile X Syndrome 
and ASD, but not play a substantial role in which people with Fragile X Syndrome will also be 
diagnosed with ASD.  
It could also be that the type of gaze avoidance associated with Fragile X Syndrome and 
demonstrated by Farzin et al. (2009) does not present as ASD symptomatology and thus does 
not covary with scores on ASD measures. It has been suggested that people with Fragile X 
Syndrome may avert gaze due to social anxiety whereas people with ASD tend to display more 
social indifference, suggesting possible difference in underlying mechanisms and presentation 
(see, e.g., Budimirovic et al., 2006). Interestingly, there are some indications of reduced 
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autonomic activity in response to emotional faces in idiopathic ASD (Hubert, Wicker, 
Monfardini, & Deruelle, 2009). This raises the possibility that different types of atypical 
autonomic responses characterise ASD and Fragile X Syndrome in response to facial emotions. 
This may add to the position that similar presentations (e.g., avoidance of eye contact) in the 
two conditions occur for different reasons. 
Neurological correlates 
Dalton et al.’s (2008) functional imaging study (described above) included an idiopathic ASD 
group and certain similarities were found between ASD and Fragile X Syndrome participants’ 
brain activation patterns. However, the degree to which these similarities (e.g., in FG 
hypoactivation) specifically reflect the emotion processing aspect of the task is not clear. The 
study also specifically assessed autistic symptomatology (measured by the SCQ) both in Fragile 
X Syndrome and people with idiopathic autism, in relation to brain activation maps and eye 
movements. The study indicates that the processing of emotional faces in Fragile X Syndrome 
is different from both typically developing and ASD groups with respect to brain activation 
maps. In addition, activation in certain areas which were specifically active in participants with 
Fragile X Syndrome (notably left hippocampus) was correlated with SCQ score. This was not 
the case in participants with idiopathic autism, suggesting potentially different 
neurophysiological pathways to ASD symptomatology, perhaps (a notion suggested by the 
authors) reflecting a reduced habituation to emotion in stimuli specifically in people with 
Fragile X Syndrome. This result is in need of replication. 
Structural imaging studies of ASD and Fragile X Syndrome have generally indicated some 
possible similar neuroanatomical correlates (e.g, increased caudate size, e.g., Langen, Durston, 
Staal, Palmen, & Van Engeland, 2007; Reiss, Abrams, Greenlaw, Freund & Denckla, 1995; 
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reduced cerebellar vermis, Kaufmann et al., 2003). However, a VBM study directly comparing 
the two found numerous differences (e.g., in basal ganglia and frontal cortex). Whilst many of 
the common and unique specified areas have been associated with social functions including 
facial emotion recognition (e.g., basal ganglia; frontal areas), how the anatomical similarities 
and differences between typically developing individuals, those with ASD and those with 
Fragile X Syndrome might relate to socio-emotional functioning remains to be fully 
investigated. 
In summary, studies indicate brain activation atypicalities in people with Fragile X Syndrome 
during facial emotion processing tasks as well as atypicalities in eye gaze and autonomic 
arousal. These may be partially distinct from those in idiopathic ASD. However, the precise 
nature of the atypicalities remains unclear. For instance, there may be a difference between 
the nature of abnormal processing for different individual emotions (e.g., sadness vs. 
happiness, Hagan et al., 2008), but this requires replication and current conclusions are limited 
by the use of only a subset of the basic emotions in the cited studies, with different emotions 
utilised in different studies. The relationships between Fragile X Syndrome, facial emotion 
processing and ASD may be highly complex. Dalton et al. (2008) found activation in certain 
brain areas (FG, possibly amygdala) to be correlated with symptoms of ASD during an emotion 
processing task. However, there was no evidence that this specifically related to the emotional 
aspects of the tasks and, of course, it is difficult to say conceptually what these differences 
represent. One study (Farzin et al, 2009) failed to establish a statistical link between 
autonomic and gaze atypicalities in response to emotional faces and ASD symptomatology. 
Given the potential importance of emotion and face processing in other people to ASD 
diagnoses, the established atypicalities in facial emotion processing within idiopathic ASD 
(Harms et al., 2010), and questionnaire-based findings that facial emotion-related difficulties 
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account for variance in ASD diagnosis in Fragile X Syndrome (Budimirovic et al., 2006), this 
warrants further exploration.  
Other Syndromes of note 
The phenotypic interpersonal characteristics of certain other syndromes suggest that research 
into the processing of facial emotion in people with the syndromes may not only further 
elucidate aspects of the phenotype, but also its relationship with ASD. For instance, in 
Angelman Syndrome, the behavioural phenotype includes a strong tendency for smiling (e.g., 
Pelc, Cheron, & Dan, 2008; Zori et al., 1992). “Simulation” theories of facial emotion 
perception (e.g., Goldman & Sripada, 2005) propose that similar neural mechanisms are 
involved in producing one’s own facial expressions and perceiving facial emotion in others. 
Does a bias towards happy facial expressions in people with Angelman Syndrome correspond 
to a bias to perceive happiness in others? If so, how might this relate to possible ASD 
presentations? In Smith-Magenis Syndrome, a strong preference for adult attention has been 
noted, which can be a prominent reinforcer of challenging behaviour (e.g., Taylor & Oliver, 
2008). Does a tendency to work for adult attention in circumstances when negative emotions 
may be displayed correspond with a difficulty distinguishing facial emotions? How might it 
affect discrimination between other emotions? Might this also relate to ASD presentations? 
These questions are currently unanswered.  
Summary and conclusions 
Of the five genetic syndromes most frequently associated with ASD in the literature (Moss and 
Howlin, 2009), papers empirically assessing facial emotion processing were found for two: 
Fragile X Syndrome and Down Syndrome. The papers indicate (different) possible 
abnormalities in facial emotion processing in these groups.  
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Processing of facial emotion in others is widely recognised as a crucial skill for normal social 
functioning, and atypicalities feature in the diagnostic criteria for ASD. In a broad sense, we 
are beginning to understand a little about the different ways in which ASD might present 
within syndrome groups (e.g., Capone et al, 2005; Budimirovic et al, 2006; Moss and Howlin, 
2009; Moss et al., 2012; Meguid, 2012). However, in order to appreciate how genetic 
syndromes may translate into ASD diagnoses, an understanding of the cognitive and emotional 
corollaries of the syndromes is important. Empirical investigations of abilities such as facial 
emotion processing in specific syndrome groups are beginning to emerge and, in some cases, 
investigators are also measuring the relationship between such abilities and measures of ASD 
(e.g., Dalton et al., 2008; Farzin et al., 2009).  
The emergent picture to date is somewhat complex and the profile of facial emotion 
processing abnormalities in Down’s Syndrome and Fragile X Syndrome is still emerging. 
Furthermore, the links between abilities such as facial emotion processing and ASD diagnoses 
remain largely hypothetical within syndrome groups. Whilst one might pontificate on the 
potential impact of (for instance) a possible facial emotion recognition impairment in Down’s 
Syndrome, or a decreased ability to regulate emotional responses to others’ emotions in 
Fragile X Syndrome, on the development of ASD symptomatology, further research is required 
to better characterise the possible connections. 
In the case of Down’s Syndrome, studies of the facial emotion recognition abilities of people 
with comorbid Down’s Syndrome and ASD are called for. In addition, studies using implicit 
measures of facial emotion processing, including gaze fixation, autonomic measures and 
neurological activity during facial emotion processing tasks may help to bridge the gap in 
understanding between the chromosomal abnormality and the possible facial emotion 
recognition difficulty. Such methods could also aid disentanglement of facial emotion 
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processing from linguistic and other cognitive demands, which is difficult in the behavioural 
tasks used to date. It is also implicit, non-linguistic aspects of facial emotion processing in 
which facial emotion processing atypicalities are most reliably found in people with ASD 
(Harms et al., 2010), and thus understanding of such aspects in Down’s Syndrome could 
illuminate the connection between the two disorders. 
Fragile X Syndrome research is more developed than research into Down’s Syndrome in its 
relationship with ASD and in the breadth of methods used to study facial emotion processing. 
The links between genetic mutation and the manner in which facial emotion is processed in 
the brain, between the genetic mutation and ASD symptomatology, and between facial 
emotion processing and ASD symptomatology have received some research attention. Still, 
many questions remain. How do autonomic responses and/or emotion-regulation atypicalities 
relate to specific emotions? How do these autonomic response differences relate to those 
found in idiopathic ASD? What do brain activation correlations with ASD symptoms during 
facial emotion processing in Fragile X Syndrome represent? While people with Fragile X 
Syndrome may not have specific problems recognising and labelling basic facial expressions 
(happiness, sadness, disgust, fear, surprise and anger) from static photographs, do they have 
more difficulty with more subtle or ambiguous facial emotions, using more complex, partially 
occluded, briefly presented or otherwise ecologically valid facial stimuli, which could 
contribute to an ASD presentation?  
Experimental investigation of the social cognitive correlates of genetic neurodevelopmental 
syndromes is, in many cases, still in its early stages. The possible relationship of social 
cognitive skills such as facial emotion recognition to diagnoses of ASD in syndrome groups 
remains largely unclear. However, research trends may indicate that the elucidation of links 
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between specific genetic syndromes, social cognitive phenotypes and behaviourally-defined 
categories such as ASD will continue in coming years. 
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Processing of facial threat emotions after acquired brain injury: a 
structural neuroimaging study. 
Abstract 
Fear, anger or disgust in the face of another person all alert the observer to the presence of 
some form of possible threat. There is currently no consensus on whether these emotions are 
represented categorically (e.g., Ekman, 1972) or dimensionally (e.g., Russell, 1980). Categorical 
models predict dissociable neural substrates in the brain, whilst dimensional models predict 
that the three threat emotions are processed by similar neural circuitry. This study assessed 
the ability of 26 chronic neurological patients with anatomically diverse, stable brain lesions, 
to recognise fear, anger and disgust in pictures of emotional faces (Ekman & Friesen, 1976), 
and compared their performance with 29 healthy age-matched individuals. The patient group 
performed significantly worse on all three emotions. For the 26 patients, we then used voxel-
based morphometry (VBM) (Ashburner & Friston, 2000) to assess in an unbiased fashion the 
relationship between accuracy of recognition of fear, anger and disgust (individually and then 
together) and the integrity of grey matter across the whole brain. We found evidence to 
support both categorical and dimensional hypotheses of emotion representation: some brain 
areas were associated specifically with recognition of anger, fear or disgust, and some were 
associated with accuracy of recognition on all three emotions. Our data may present issues for 
any position maintaining that emotions are represented entirely categorically, or entirely 





Introduction         
Discerning fear, anger or disgust in the face of another person alerts one to the presence of a 
threat, and the ability to detect facial displays of these emotions is crucial both to normal 
social interaction and to responding appropriately to the environment. Whilst they are all 
broadly associated with threat, these three emotions are linked with different triggers and 
responses. Disgust may be triggered by a potential source of contamination and can activate 
reflexes, such as gagging (e.g., Koerner & Antony, 2010), associated with avoidance of 
pathogens (e.g., Curtis, De Barra, & Aunger, 2011; Ekman & Cordaro, 2011). Fear occurs as a 
response to potential physical or psychological harm and may activate impulses to freeze or 
flee (e.g., Ekman & Cordaro, 2011). Anger can be stimulated by, for example, obstruction to 
goal attainment or someone else’s attempt to cause harm (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011) and may 
be associated with physiological changes compatible with fighting, such as increased blood 
flow to the arms (Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). Thus, observing facial displays of fear, 
anger or disgust in another person can provide a rich source of information about the mental 
state of the other, and about the presence of, and forms of, threat in the environment. There 
may be common neural substrates for processing facial emotion in other people and the self 
(e.g., Goldman & Sripada, 2005), so (for example) processing the disgusted expression on a 
friend’s face may activate similar mechanisms to those involved in feeling disgust, and 
producing the facial expression, oneself (e.g., Wicker et al., 2003). 
Despite extensive study over several decades, questions remain about the relationship of the 
three “threat” emotions (and others) to one another. There is an ongoing debate about 
whether the emotions displayed on faces (and, indeed, emotions more generally) represent 
discrete categories (e.g. Ekman et al., 1971) or points along continuous dimensions (e.g., 
Russell 1980).The categorical hypothesis of emotion representation suggests that fear, anger 
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and disgust comprise three of a set of six “basic”, qualitatively distinct emotions (e.g., Ekman, 
1971; Izard, 1977; Ekman, 1992) – anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise. It is 
postulated that each of the basic emotions not only has its own evolutionary history and 
physiology, but corresponds to a relatively specific facial configuration, perceived reliably and 
similarly across cultures (e.g., Ekman, 1973; Ekman, 1992).  
Conversely, the two-dimensional hypothesis (e.g., Schlosberg, 1954; Russell, 1980;  Russell, 
2003) postulates no qualitative distinction between emotion categories, instead advocating 
that specific emotional states fall at specific points in a continuous emotional space defined by 
two orthogonal dimensions: i) valence, the subjective experience of the affect, which varies in 
its pleasantness, and ii) arousal, the degree to which an emotion is calm or excitatory (Russell, 
1980; 2003).Whilst the emotional states linked with labels of fear, anger and disgust are all 
negative in valence and associated with relatively high arousal, there are differences, such as 
that lower arousal may be associated with disgust than with fear or anger (e.g., Adolphs, 
Russell, & Tranel, 1999).  Differences in arousal and valence associated with different 
emotional states may be consistent with, for instance, autonomic arousal differences on 
viewing faces displaying different emotions (Johnsen, Thayer, & Hugdahl, 1995). 
The discrete category and two-dimensional models are associated with different predictions 
on the localization of emotional processing in the brain. The discrete category hypothesis 
predicts a qualitative neural dissociation across emotions, with different brain areas 
associated with different emotional categories. On the other hand, the bi-dimensional account 
of emotions predicts that similar brain regions will be involved in processing all emotional 
states, with quantitative differences across emotions. Neuropsychological (as well as 
neuroimaging) data have to date provided inconclusive evidence to distinguish between these 
hypotheses. Whilst certain brain regions have been shown consistently to be involved in 
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emotional processing, their emotional specificity is debated. The amygdala, insula and basal 
ganglia, as well as areas of frontal and parietal cortex, are among the brain regions which have 
consistently been linked to the processing of facial anger, disgust or fear. However, whilst in 
some studies each of these regions has been associated specifically with impairment in the 
recognition of one or another of the threat emotions, other findings indicate a more general 
involvement in facial emotion processing. Below, this evidence is discussed with reference to a 
few key brain regions.  
Amygdala: fear, anger, valence or arousal? 
Patients with bilateral amygdala damage have been found to have relatively specific difficulty 
in recognising fear (e.g., Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; although see Adolphs, 
Tranel, et al., 1999). Such specific lesion-expression mappings may be taken to support a 
categorical representation of emotions at the level of brain function, and the role of the 
amygdala in the processing of fear has been emphasised over the years (e.g., LeDoux, 2003). 
However, the picture is not simple: some patients with similar lesions have also been found to 
have deficits in the ability to recognise other facial emotions, including anger (Graham, 
Devinsky, & Labar, 2007), although this is inconsistent across patients (Adolphs, Tranel, 
Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; Calder, 1996). Neuroimaging data are also mixed with respect to 
the specificity of the amygdala’s involvement. A meta-analysis of 105 fMRI papers (Fusar-Poli 
et al.,2009) confirmed greater sensitivity in the amygdala for fear than for other of the basic 
facial emotions. However, the authors also note its significant activation during presentation 
of other emotions, and some neuroimaging data directly suggest a role for the amygdala in 
processing the valence dimension (e.g.,Todorov & Engell, 2008) or the arousal dimension 
(Lewis, Critchley, Rotshtein, & Dolan, 2007; Rotshtein, Malach, Hadar, Graif, & Hendler, 
2001).For Lane et al. (1997), the amygdala forms a part of an emotion processing circuit 
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(including various other cortical and subcortical areas) which represents the pleasure 
dimension of an emotion, with activity in different parts of this circuit said to differ for 
pleasant and unpleasant emotions. Others (e.g., Adolphs, Russell, & Tranel, 1999) attribute a 
role to the amygdala for assessing the level of emotional arousal in facial (and other) stimuli. 
Overall, then, both neuropsychological and neuroimaging data provide mixed support for both 
the two-dimensional and categorical models of emotion processing with respect to the 
function of the amygdala. 
Insula and Basal Ganglia: disgust, anger, arousal? 
Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young (2000) describe a patient with lesions to the insula 
and to the basal ganglia with selective deficits in facial disgust recognition, and patients with 
early Huntingdon’s Disease (HD) – a genetic neurodegenerative condition in which severe 
basal ganglia degeneration is prominent – have also been found to have particularly impaired 
recognition of disgust stimuli (Montagne et al., 2006; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; Wang, 
Hoosain, Yang, Meng, & Wang, 2003). Hennenlotter et al.(2004) conducted an fMRI study of 
the processing of emotional stimuli in a group of pre-manifest HD mutation carriers and found 
reduced activation of the insula and basal ganglia during presentation of disgust stimuli. Under 
a categorical view of emotion representations, these results may suggest that disgust, as a 
distinct emotional category (Ekman, 1971), could specifically be subserved by regions of 
insular cortex and basal ganglia. However, again the evidence is inconsistent. Milders, 
Crawford, Lamb, & Simpson(2003) did not find impaired disgust recognition in their HD group, 
instead reporting relatively worse performance for fear stimuli. In addition, Calder, Keane, 
Lawrence, & Manes(2004) report specific impairment of anger recognition after damage to the 
ventral striatum, suggesting that this area may specifically subserve anger. Henley et al.(2008) 
found that reduced striatal volume in people with early and premanifest HD was associated 
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with impairments in the recognition of disgust, but also of anger, fear and surprise. Johnson et 
al.(2007) found that recognition of all negative emotions was impaired in people with the HD 
mutation (potentially more in line with dimensional views of emotion), although this was not 
related to striatal volume. Some lesion data also directly implicate the insula into dimensional 
accounts of emotion. Berntson et al. (2011) found that people with lesions to the insula 
showed attenuated valence ratings of emotional pictures, as well as reporting reduced arousal 
to both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli. 
Neuroimaging data in normal subjects are also mixed. One meta-analysis of 105 studies 
suggested greatest insula sensitivity for disgust, but also activation in response to anger 
(Fusar-Poli et al., 2009). Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor's (2003) meta-analysis of 65 studies 
indicated a role for the insula in processing the valence of emotions, and some (e.g., Critchley, 
Corfield, Chandler, Mathias, & Dolan, 2000) have found the insula to be implicated in arousal. 
For the basal ganglia, a meta-analysis (of 55 fMRI and positron emission tomography (PET) 
studies; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002) indicated a particular relationship with disgust 
processing, but also that areas such as the putamen were involved in processing facial 
emotion more generally. Thus, as for the amygdala, the emotional specificity of both the basal 
ganglia and the insula with respect to the threat emotions remains unclear.  
Frontal, parietal and temporal cortical regions – categorical or dimensional? 
Several studies have also indicated that disruption to certain frontal and prefrontal regions can 
be differentially involved in impairment of the detection of different emotional states. For 
instance, Marinkovic, Trebon, Chauvel, & Halgren (2000) found relatively specific impairments 
in fear recognition following surgical resection of right prefrontal cortex. Harmer, Thilo, 
Rothwell, & Goodwin (2001) found that disruption of medial frontal cortex using transcranial 
magnetic stimulation increased reaction times when identifying morphs of angry, but not 
59 
 
happy, facial expressions (although other threat emotions were not assessed). However, 
various frontal and prefrontal regions are also thought to have a more general role in emotion 
processing, including facial emotion recognition (e.g., Fusar-Poli et al., 2009, for a meta-
analysis of fMRI data), and some data from brain damaged patients support this. For instance, 
Keane, Calder, Hodges & Young (2002) report a general impairment in the recognition of 
emotion in faces and voices in patients with frontal variant frontotemporal dementia. 
Heberlein, Padon, Gillihan, Farah& Fellows (2008) found that lesions to ventromedial frontal 
cortex generally impaired facial emotion recognition, which may suggest that these regions 
represent general aspects of emotion, such as their dimensional properties. 
Other cortical regions to which damage has been empirically associated with reduced overall 
ability to recognise facial emotions include an area of sensory cortex within the frontoparietal 
cortex (Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 2000). It has been proposed that 
observation of emotional states in others activates similar neural circuitry to that when the 
emotion is experienced by the self (e.g., Wicker et al., 2003), and also that responding to 
others’ expressions involves activation of the motor programs one would use to produce that 
expression oneself (Preston & de Waal, 2003). The parietal regions in Adolphs et al.’s (2000) 
study are thought to be involved in the correspondence between movements in self and other 
(Iacoboni et al., 1999).Whilst this account perhaps fits most obviously with categorical 
accounts (with specific categories of emotion corresponding to specific motor programs), it 
may also be compatible with dimensional accounts, assuming that specific points in a 
dimensional emotion space correspond in some predictable way with sensorimotor 
representations.  
Finally, areas such as the superior temporal sulcus (STS), are known to respond to changeable 
aspects of faces, such as facial expressions (e.g., Andrews & Ewbank, 2004).The relationship of 
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this area with specific facial emotions may be complex, with elements of both categorical and 
graded representations (e.g., Said, Moore, Norman, Haxby, & Todorov, 2010). 
In summary, brain lesion data as well as data from neuroimaging studies, are mixed with 
respect to the degree of overlap between the processing of (facial) anger, disgust and fear they 
suggest at a neural level. There is therefore no consensus on whether they support a 
categorical or dimensional notion of emotion representation in the brain. Many of the lesion 
studies described above rely on individual patients, or series of patients, selected on the basis 
of their specific cognitive or emotional deficit, or the anatomical location of their lesions, 
which makes it difficult to draw more general conclusions. Adolphs et al. (2000) used a 
technique whereby the visible lesion on each patient’s MRI or CT scan was transferred to a 
reference brain, and lesions were summed for groups of patients defined by a median split of 
their overall emotion recognition accuracy.  Whilst this study has the advantage of assessing 
the importance of specific brain areas over a large number of brain-damaged patients with 
various different types of lesion, it, like many of the other lesion studies previously mentioned, 
relies on visual delineation of lesions and on a lesion overlap method. It is primarily a 
descriptive technique which is not statistically based. This also has the disadvantage of not 
taking into account areas of brain damage not immediately obvious to the naked eye, and/or 
not part of the perceived “main” lesion of a patient.  
A more objective assessment of structure-function mapping can be achieved by use of Voxel-
Based Morphometry (VBM) (e.g., Ashburner & Friston, 2000), which was employed in Henley 
et al.’s, (2008) study of HD. VBM provides an unbiased and comprehensive method of relating 
differences in behavioural variables to structural brain variation (which may or may not be 
visible to the naked eye). In essence, for a series of participants’ brain images, each voxel in 
each brain is assigned (based on scanning data) a value representing the probability that it 
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represents intact tissue. Behavioural data is obtained for each participant. Then a separate 
multiple regression is computed for each voxel of the brain to assess the correlation of a 
specific behavioural measure (e.g., emotion recognition accuracy) with the integrity of the 
brain tissue in that voxel. Thus, if damage to a specific brain area affects performance on a 
specific task, a significant association with performance may be expected in the corresponding 
voxels, whereas if damage in that area does not affect this task, there would be no association. 
In Henley et al.’s (2008) paper, regions of interest in the striatum and insula were specified 
based on the known common neural correlates of HD, but VBM may also be used to assess the 
whole brain in groups of participants with more varying lesions (e.g., Leff et al., 2009; 
Chechlacz et al., 2010; Sui, Chechlacz, & Humphreys, 2012; Demeyere, Rotshtein, & 
Humphreys, 2012). 
Our aim in this study was to assess the recognition of the three commonly researched basic 
“threat” emotions – anger, disgust and fear – in a group of patients with anatomically diverse 
brain damage, and to relate brain lesions to emotion recognition deficits in an unbiased 
fashion across the whole brain. In doing so we hoped to clarify the degree to which the lesions 
causing impairments in the recognition of fear, anger and disgust are overlapping and the 
degree to which they are distinct. Fear, anger and disgust have been the subject of many 
studies of facial emotion recognition impairment in brain-damaged patients. These three 
emotions are also generally placed in similar gross regions of commonly-discussed emotional 
dimensions –each is unpleasant (negative in valence) and is associated with relatively high 
arousal. Thus a dimensional model (Lane, 1997; Russell, 1980) (even one in which there is a 
distinction between the brain areas subserving positive and negative emotions) might predict a 
high degree of overlap between these three emotions with respect to the regions of the brain 
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in which damage is correlated with impaired facial emotion recognition. A categorical account 
of emotion representation may emphasise distinct brain regions for anger, disgust and fear.  
We assessed the ability of a group of 26 chronic neurological patients with anatomically varied, 
stable brain lesions to recognise facial displays of fear, anger and disgust. Two different 
experiments were used to assess emotion recognition accuracy, one using static and another 
using dynamic (moving) facial stimuli. To characterise the overall nature of impairments in the 
recognition of these three emotions, we compared the accuracy of the 26 patients with that of 
a group of 29 neurologically intact control participants. We then used Voxel-Based 
Morphometry (VBM) to conduct a whole-brain assessment of the relationship between brain 




Twenty-six participants in the patient group (mean age 65.0 years, s.d. 12.9 years, 3 females)  
were recruited from the long-term panel of neuropsychological volunteers established by the 
Behavioural Brain Sciences Group and the Birmingham University Cognitive Screen (BUCS, 
www.bucs.bham.ac.uk) at the School of Psychology, University of Birmingham. Inclusion 
criteria were that a) the patients had acquired brain damage (various aetiologies, e.g. stroke, 
carbon monoxide poisoning) and were not in an acute stage (> 12 months post injury), and (b) 
the patient had a T1 weighted 3T MRI scan. Each participant provided informed consent 
according to the procedures in agreement with ethics protocols at the School of Psychology 
and Birmingham University Imaging Centre (BUIC). Twenty-nine healthy control participants 
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were also recruited (mean age 66.8 years, s.d. 11.4 years, 9 females) by local advertisement. 
Participants were reimbursed for their time. There was no significant difference between the 
mean ages of the two groups (t(52) = 0.54; p > 0.1).  
Stimuli, Design and Procedure 
Two facial affect recognition tasks – a “static” task and a “dynamic” task – were used. This was 
in order to minimise the impact of specific procedural factors. In the patient group, data from 
the dynamic task were available for 25 participants and data from the static task were available 
for 23 participants. 
In the control group, 22 participants completed the static task and 15 participants completed 
the dynamic task, with 8 participants completing both tasks. 
Participants completed the different tasks in an order independently randomly determined for 
each participant. 
Dynamic task 
The stimuli and the experimental procedure were adapted from Calder, Young, Rowland, & 
Perrett (1997) and Phillips et al. (1998). 
Stimuli 
Stimuli were derived from Ekman & Friesen's (1976) series (Figures 1 and 2). A trial in the 
dynamic task involved watching a face transform from 100% neutral through 18 morphed 
intermediate stages (e.g., 90% neutral, 10% expression) to 100% expression over the course of 
2 seconds. This resulted in an animation appearing to show an initially expressionless person 
adopt an emotional expression. Nine facial identities (five female) were used in the experiment 
proper, with each identity posing two different expressions. An extra identity was used for the 
64 
 
practice trials, posing all six expressions. Models’ hair and background details were masked 
with grey (see Figure 1). 
Each face subtended an approximate visual angle of between 7.7 and 9.4 degrees in the 
vertical plane and between 4.8 and 6.6 degrees horizontally. 
Design and procedure 
Each participant completed six practice trials (one for each expression) and thirty-six 
experimental trials (six for each expression). The experimenter ensured apparent 
understanding of the task before proceeding from practice to experimental trials. Experimental 
trials were split into two blocks of eighteen. The stimuli were presented in a pseudo-random 
order. At the start of each trial, a face with a neutral expression was displayed.  The 
experimenter then pressed the space bar to animate the face, at which point its expression 
moved from 100% neutral through 18 intermediate images to 100% expression over the course 
2 seconds. The image of the face displaying the full emotional expression then remained on 
the screen until a response was made. On the left of the experiment window were six 
“buttons” arranged in a column, each with an emotion word on it: from top to bottom, anger, 
disgust, happiness, sadness, surprise and fear. When the animation as complete, the 
experimenter read the six possible response options to the participant, after which the 
participant gave a verbal response to indicate his or her chosen expression label, or pointed to 
the chosen label. The experimenter gave the corresponding response by clicking the left 
mouse button over the button with the chosen label. Once this was complete, the next trial 





















Figure 2. Example of beginning (a, 100% neutral), end (e, 100% angry) and 3 
intermediate (b, c, d) pictures used to create animations of facial expressions 
in dynamic task. An actual trial involves 18 intermediate consecutive pictures 
(20 total), one replacing the other, over the course of 1.5 seconds.  
a b d e 
Example of each of six “basic” facial expression stimuli (Ekman & Friesen, 






The static task was also a simple categorisation of prototypical, 100% (Ekman and Friesen, 
1976) facial expressions (Figure 1). Faces of ten identities (six female) each posed six basic 
facial expressions. Faces were presented on a grey background with outline features cropped. 
Each stimulus subtended an approximate visual angle of 10.5 degrees in the vertical plane and 
7.5 degrees horizontally. 
Procedure 
There were 60 trials. The stimulus for each trial was selected pseudorandomly, and there was 
no time limit for a response. At the start of the experiment, basic instructions appeared on the 
screen, which were also read aloud by the experimenter. The experimenter ensured apparent 
comprehension of the experiment before proceeding. 
 
Each emotion name was assigned (randomly, for each participant) a number from 1 to 6. These 
assignments were displayed across the bottom of the screen on each trial in white writing 
(e.g., 1 = fearful, 2 = sad, etc.). Participants were instructed to press the number, on a 
keyboard, of the expression that best described the image. The experimenter ensured 
understanding of the correspondences and read out the possible responses when appropriate. 
Also where appropriate, due to motor or other disabilities, the participant instead indicated to 
the experimenter the number or the expression they wished to select and the experimenter 
pressed the indicated key (approx. 9 participants). After a response was given, there was a 





Correct responses were scored 1 and incorrect responses scored 0. Hence, the score expected 
by chance is approximately 0.17 (1/6) in both tasks. Figure 3 shows the accuracy for each of 
the three threat emotions across the two tasks in the patient and control groups.  
For participants who had completed both tasks (22 patients and 8 controls), an ANOVA was 
conducted with accuracy as the dependent variable, task (2 levels: static and dynamic) and 
emotion (3 levels: fear, anger, disgust) as within-subject independent variables, and participant 
type (2 levels: patient and control) as between-subject independent variable. Where 
necessary, Huynh-Feldt corrections for non-sphericity were used  (Howell, 2002). There was a 
significant overall effect of emotion, F(2, 56) = 5.42, p < 0.01. Accuracy for fear (mean 0.48, s.d. 
0.25) was significantly lower than that for anger (mean 0.63, s.d.0.22) and disgust (mean 0.64, 
s.d. 0.28) (fear vs anger: t(29) = 3.48; p < 0.01; fear vs disgust: t(29) = 3.06, p < 0.01). Accuracy 
for anger and disgust did not differ significantly from each other (p > 0.8). There was also a 
significant effect of participant type, F(1, 28) = 14.25, p = 0.01, with greater accuracy in the 
control group (mean 0.77, s.d. 0.08) than the patient group (mean 0.51, s.d. 0.14). However, 
there was no main effect of task type, although there was a trend for higher mean accuracy in 
the dynamic than the static task, F(1, 28) = 2.84, p = 0.10. No two- or three-way interaction 
reached significance (max F < 0.3). 
Overall, patients performed more poorly than controls, but this did not interact with emotion. 
Fear was more difficult to identify than the other two emotions, for both patients and controls. 
Analyses were also separately conducted for the static and dynamic tasks in order that data 
from the full sample (i.e., not just those who had completed both tasks) could be analysed. In 
each task, there was a significant effect of emotion (static task F(2, 86) = 4.96; p < 0.01; 
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dynamic task F(2, 76) = 7.80, p < 0.01) and a significant effect of participant type (static task 
F(1, 43) = 18.51, p < 0.001; dynamic task F(1, 36) = 13.55, p < 0.001), and in neither task was 
there a significant interaction between emotion and participant type (both tasks F < 1). In each 
task, fear was recognised significantly less accurately than each of the other two emotions 
(static task fear vs. anger, t(44) = 2.04, p < 0.05; static task fear vs. disgust, t(44) = 3.15, p < 
0.01. Dynamic task fear vs. anger, t(39) = 4.01, p < 0.001; dynamic task fear vs. disgust, t(39) = 
3.07, p < 0.01). Accuracy for anger and disgust did not differ significantly from each other in 
either task (static task t(44) = 0.91, dynamic task t(39) = 0.31). 
These analyses for the two tasks separately thus confirm an effect of emotion (with fear being 
less easily recognised than anger or disgust), and of participant type (with patients having 
lower accuracy than controls), but no interaction between the two. They also confirm that a 
similar pattern of results is found for both the static and dynamic tasks. 
Discussion 
The group of participants with brain damage performed significantly more poorly than the 
healthy age-matched controls in their identification of anger, disgust and fear in facial stimuli. 
However, there was no evidence that any one of the three threat emotions was any more 
affected by brain damage than any other. In one sense this is not a surprising finding given the 
relatively diverse nature of brain lesions in the patient group. Fear was the emotion which was 
least accurately identified, with no significant difference between anger and disgust. This is 
broadly commensurate with previous literature (e.g., Rapcsak et al., 2000). 
The pattern of results was the same for the static and dynamic tasks, although there was a 
non-significant trend for higher accuracy in the dynamic task. Because there were other 
procedural and presentational differences between the static and dynamic tasks (e.g., 
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presentation of response options on the screen, appearance of experiment window, length of 
experiment), it is not possible to directly assess the impact of using moving as opposed to 
stationary stimuli. However, there was no indication in our data that the moving or static 
pictures had a differential effect on the different groups of participants, or on the recognition 
of different emotions. 
Voxel-Based Morphometry (VBM) 
In this study, we used VBM to assess the statistical relationship between brain structure and 
recognition accuracy for anger, fear and disgust in the 26 patients. 
Methods 
Behavioural Data 
Emotion recognition accuracy 
There was no evidence in the behavioural data (above) that the task type (static or dynamic) 
interacted with the specific emotion (anger, fear or disgust), and thus for the VBM we 
combined data for the static and dynamic tasks. Although the means for the static and 
dynamic tasks did not significantly differ, there was a non-significant trend (p  = 0.10) for 
greater accuracy in the dynamic task. Therefore, before combining the two sets of scores, we 
converted them to standard scores (Z scores) based on the mean and standard deviation of the 
data from the control participants (see Table 1). Thus each patient’s Z score represented the 
number of standard deviations from the control’s group mean, averaged across the static and 
dynamic tasks. Where data were missing for either task (4 participants), the score from the 
other task was used. To ensure that this treatment of missing data was not biasing the results, 
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we repeated the analyses substituting group means for missing values. This did not notably 
affect the findings. 





Anger Static 0.68 0.21 
Disgust Static 0.76 0.19 
Fear Static 0.61 0.30 
Anger Dynamic 0.88 0.18 
Disgust Dynamic 0.86 0.21 
Fear Dynamic 0.65 0.33 
Table 1. Mean and standard deviation of scores for control group, for calculation of Z scores.  
Covariates 
The score from a picture naming task from the Birmingham University Cognitive Screen 
(Humphreys et al., 2012, www.bcos.bham.ac.uk) was included as a covariate. In this task, 
patients were presented with 14 line drawings of everyday objects, such as an umbrella and 
bunch of grapes. Each drawing is on a separate piece of paper and the patient has up to fifteen 
seconds to name it. For analysis we used the number of correct responses (from 0 to 14) for 
each participant. The mean score on this measure was 8.9 (s.d. 4.6). Score on this picture 
naming measure did not correlate significantly with any of the emotion accuracies individually 
or as a mean, or with any of the Z scores for the analysis.  
This covariate was included to partially account for the influence of less specific perceptual 
difficulties in participants. 
Age, gender and handedness were also included as covariates in the analysis.  
71 
 
Brain imaging data 
Scanning took place at Birmingham University Imaging Centre, using a 3T Philips Achieva MRI 
system with 8-channel phased array SENSE head coil. A T1-weighted sequence (sagittal 
orientation, TE/TR= 3.8/8.4ms, voxel size 1x1x1mm) was used to acquire anatomical scans. 
Scanning time was 5 minutes. We used SPM software (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~spm) to analyse 
the images and the relationship between imaging and behavioural data. 
Image pre-processing 
Procedures for image pre-processing are as used by Chechalcz et al. (2010) and Sui, Chechlacz 
& Humphreys (2012).  
MRICro (Chris Rorder, Georgia Tech, Atlanta, GA, USA) was first used to convert and reorient T1 
scans from the 26 patients. SPM8 (Statistical Parametric Mapping, Welcome Department of 
Cognitive Neurology, London UK) was used to process the T1 scans. Scans were transformed to 
standard MNI space by use of the unified-segmentation procedure (Ashburner & Friston, 2005) 
as adapted by Seghier et al.(2008). This modified segmentation procedure was used to aid 
spatial normalisation and tissue classification in lesioned brains, by adding an extra tissue class 
accounting for abnormal tissue (Seghier et al., 2008). The resultant grey matter and white 
matter probability maps were smoothed with 12mm FWHM Gausian filter (necessary due to 
the assumption of random field theory used for reliability tests, Worsley, 2003). Each image 
was visually inspected to assess whether the segmentation and normalisation procedures were 
successful. The grey matter maps were then used to carry out a voxel-by-voxel analysis of the 
relationship between brain damage and our measures of emotion-labelling ability (see below). 
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For descriptive proposes we created an overlap map that represents the distribution of lesions 
across the entire patients sample. For each patient a binary map was computed, representing 
the acquired lesion area, following the procedure specified by Seghier et al. (2008). These 
binary maps were summed using SPM to produce a lesion overlap map (Figure 4).  
VBM analyses 
Function-lesion mapping was computed using grey matter maps derived from the pre-
processed scans of the 26 patients.  For each participant, each brain voxel has been assigned a 
number between 0 and 1 representing the probability it is composed of intact grey matter (see 
above). Each participant also has accuracy scores between 0 and 1 for emotion recognition 
(see below). For each voxel, we asked whether a given accuracy score is a significant predictor 
of the probability that the voxel is composed of intact grey matter. We report results based on 
a combination of peak height and cluster size (Poline, Worsley, Evans, & Friston, 1997), 
considering reliable clusters larger than 60 voxels (480mm3), in which every voxel showed a 
reliable effect of Z > 2.86 (p < 0.005). A VBM analysis was conducted including accuracy for 
anger, disgust and fear, as well as age, gender, handedness and Picture Naming score (see 
above) as covariates.  
Within this analysis, different sets of contrasts were performed. First, to assess for dissociative 
neural correlates, the contributions of each emotion within the model were assessed. Clusters 
of voxels are reported in which each emotion makes a statistically significant contribution to 
predictions of tissue integrity (e.g., for fear, contrast weights (1,0,0) for (fear> 0, anger, 
disgust)). These analyses detect areas in which there is a reliable correlation between accuracy 
(for a given emotion) and tissue integrity. Subsequently, we used exclusive masking to test 
whether the observed correlations were specific for the assessed emotion and were not 
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observed with the other two, using an interaction  contrast (e.g., for fear, interaction contrast 
mask weights (1,-0.5,-0.5) for (fear> ( anger+disgust)). The interaction contrast used for the 
mask was thresholded at p < 0.05, as accustomed in SPM. These contrast analyses detect areas 
in which the lesion-behaviour correlation (for a given emotion) differs significantly from 0 and 
this effect is also significantly greater than for the other two emotions.  
To test for common neural correlates across all three expressions, a contrast was also 
performed (“overall analysis”, contrast weights (1,1,1) for the three emotions) to assess the 
combined contribution of anger, disgust and fear accuracies in the prediction of voxel status.  
Anatomical labels for clusters were obtained using the SPM Anatomy Toolbox 
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~spm).  
Results 
Lesion overlap map (Figure 4) 
This demonstrates the spread and the location of the acquired lesions in the sample of 
neurological patients. Overall, the lesions covered all regions of particular interest excluding 
the medial part and the most anterior parts of the frontal cortex. The population did not 
include acquired lesions in the most superior parts of the brain. Finally, lesions appear more 





Figure 3. Accuracy of recognition of threat 
emotions on static (top) and dynamic (bottom) 
tasks for patients and controls.   
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Figure 4. Lesion overlap map. Brighter colours indicate more patients with a lesion to that 





Evidence for the discrete categorical models of Emotions 
Figures 5 to 7 show the areas correlated with (respectively) accuracy for disgusted, fearful and 
angry faces, both before and after contrast masking. For each area specifically associated with 
an emotion (after contrast masking), the beta value for the three emotions is plotted, with 95% 
confidence intervals. Essentially, if the 95% confidence interval for an emotion falls entirely 
above 0, accuracy on the emotion makes a significant contribution to prediction of grey matter 
integrity at this location. 
Disgust 
Reduced accuracy in recognition of disgust was associated with damage to an area extending 
over parts of the right middle orbital gyrus, the right middle frontal gyrus and the right inferior 
frontal gyrus (p. orbitalis), into the right anterior insula (619 voxels; peak coordinates 38, 44, -
14; Z = 3.12)  (see Figure 5a). 
After contrasting out the effects of the other two emotions, it was found that a portion of this 
cluster (Figure 5b) in the right middle orbital gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus (p. orbitalis) 
was uniquely associated with accuracy of disgust recognition (201 voxels; coordinates at peak 
33, 44, -14; Z = 3.12). 
Fear 
Damage to three areas was associated with accuracy of fear recognition.This included the left 
thalamus (79 voxels; coordinates at peak -10, -20, 4; Z = 2.96), the left paracentral lobule 
extending into the left supplementary motor area (SMA) (200 voxels; coordinates at peak  -8, -
28, 66; Z = 2.99), andthe right middle cingulate cortex extending into right supplementary 
motor area (SMA) (65 voxels; peak coordinates 14, -14, 46; Z = 3.01). These areas are displayed 
in Figure 6. 
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Each of these three clusters was uniquely associated with reduced accuracy in fear perception, 
remaining unchanged after partialling out the effects of accuracy on the other two emotions. 
Anger  
Lesions involving a region in the left inferior temporal gyrus (139 voxels; coordinates at peak -
50, -16, -36; Z = 3.03), superior and middle frontal gyri (95 voxels; coordinates at peak 48, 28, 
46; Z = 3.39) and the middle frontal gyrus (73 voxels; coordinates at peak 24, 60, 34; Z = 3.03) 
were associated with reduced accuracy in recognition of anger (Figure 7). 
After accounting for (contrasting out) the effects of accuracy on the other two emotions, it was 
found that the lesion in the right superior and middle frontal gyri (73 voxels; coordinates at 
peak 24, 60, 34; Z = 3.03) was specifically associated with accuracy for recognition of anger 
expression. 
Overall 
To test for common effects across the three expressions, the main effect of accuracy on tissue 
integrity was computed.  Two brain regions were associated with the combined accuracies for 
fear, anger and disgust. These regions were in the left inferior temporal gyrus (280 voxels; 
coordinates at peak -34, -8, -40; Z = 3.41), and the superior right frontal gyrus (95 voxels; 
coordinates at peak 50, 24, 48; Z = 3.57). Thus lesions affecting these regions led to overall 














Figure 5a and 5b. Areas correlated with 
accuracy for disgust (a) and after 
specifically contrasting out the effects of 
fear and anger (b). 
Figure 5c. Beta for different emotions at 
peak of right orbitofrontal “blob” (b) (38, 
44, -14) associated specifically with disgust. 

















Figure 6a, 6b, 6c. Areas correlated with 
accuracy for fear (unchanged by contrast 
masking to partial out other two 
emotions).  
a. Area in left paracentral lobule 
and SMA 
b. Area in left thalamus (part of 
blob a. also visible) 
















Disgust Anger Fear 
Figure 6d. Beta for different emotions at 
peak of left paracentral lobule/SMA “blob” 
(-8, -28, 66) associated specifically with 
fear. Red bars indicate 95%  confidence 
intervals. 
DisgustD Anger Fear 
Figure 6e (above). Beta for different emotions 
at peak of left thalamus “blob” (-10, -20, 4) 
associated specifically with fear. Red bars 
indicate 95%  confidence intervals. 
DisgustF Anger Fear 
Figure 6f. Beta for different emotions at peak 
of right cingulate “blob” (14, -14, 46) 
associated specifically with fear. Red bars 














Figure 7 a, b and c. Areas whose 
integrity correlates with accuracy of 
anger recognition. Blob b also 
specifically associated with accuracy for 
anger after contrasting out the effects 
of other emotions. Figure 7d. Beta 
(predictive contribution) for different 
emotions at peak of right frontal “blob” 
(b) (24, 60, 34) associated specifically 
with anger. Red bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals. 

















Figure 8. 8a &8b. Areas associated with overall 
accuracy on all three emotions. Figure 8c. Beta 
for different emotions at peak of left temporal 
“blob” (-34, -8, 40) associated with overall 
accuracy. Figure 8d. Beta for different emotions 
at peak of right frontal “blob” (50, 24, 48) 
associated with overall accuracy. Red bars 
indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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Our data indicate that participants with brain damage of diverse anatomical locations (Figure 
4) performed more poorly than age-matched healthy controls in their recognition of facial 
anger, disgust and fear. There was no evidence that any of the three emotions was 
disproportionately impaired in the patient group, with a similar pattern of accuracy displayed 
across patients and controls. This may be related to the diversity of the lesions within the 
patients’ brains.  
The VBM analysis suggested that, within our sample of brain-damaged patients, distinct areas 
of damage were associated with reduced accuracy for anger, fear and disgust. However, there 
were also brain areas in which damage was associated with reduced ability across all three 
emotions. These findings suggest both common and unique areas which are required for 
identification of the different “threat” emotions, providing support for both the categorical 
and dimensional models of emotion processing. 
Possible emotion-specific areas 
For each of the three emotions, brain regions were found in which damage was associated 
with emotion recognition accuracy. Interestingly, there was no overlap between the regions for 
the three separate emotion contrasts (although some areas were found to be associated with 
accuracy across all three; see below). In each case, at least some areas remained significantly 
associated with accuracy after specifically contrasting out the effects of the other emotions. 
For disgust, an area of right orbital frontal cortex (Figures 5b and 5c) was specifically associated 
with accuracy. Regions within the left thalamus, left paracentral cortex and right cingulate 
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correlated specifically with the ability to detect fear (Figure 6). An area of right superior frontal 
cortex correlated specifically with accuracy on anger (Figures 7c and 7d). 
The location of these areas might be broadly understood in terms of previous research. 
Given the frequent association in the literature of insular cortex with disgust (e.g., Calder et al., 
2000), it is interesting that we found that damage to this area was correlated with poorer 
disgust recognition but there was no statistical evidence that this was specific to disgust. Only 
the right orbital frontal area survived contrast masking.  
Accuracy of fear recognition was specifically associated with damage to areas of possible 
sensory and motor function (around the central sulcus). This is interesting in relation to the 
simulation theory of emotion (see, e.g., Goldman and Sripada, 2005). Damage to similar areas 
was found to associate with emotion recognition impairment in all six “basic” emotions by 
Adolphs et al. (2000), who concluded that we may recognise others’ emotional states by 
“internally generating somatosensory representations that simulate how the other individual 
would feel when displaying a certain facial expression”. It is intriguing that we found such 
lesions to specifically impair accuracy on fearful faces, which might suggest that sensory motor 
representations are particularly crucial for fear recognition. Our data also suggest that damage 
to cingulate cortex and the left thalamus correlated specifically with poorer fear recognition.  It 
has been suggested that middle cingulate cortex plays a role in processing negative emotions, 
as well as pain (see Shackman et al., 2011, for a review), so it is interesting that our results 
specifically implicate the region in fear processing. The thalamus – also found in our study to 
be specifically linked with fear recognition – has been found to be active during emotion 
processing (e.g., Petrini, Crabbe, Sheridan, & Pollick, 2011), and has an established role in 
arousal generally (e.g., Schiff, 2008). Parts of the thalamus are also anatomically linked with 
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the amygdala and have been implicated in fear perception in neuroimaging studies (e.g., Das et 
al., 2005).Our data support a position in which there is a specific relationship between parts of 
the thalamus and the recognition of fear, rather than this region having a generically crucial 
role in emotion recognition.  
A small area of superior right frontal cortex was specifically associated with accuracy on angry 
faces. Lesions to a number of areas of frontal cortex have been associated with reduced facial 
emotion recognition (e.g., Dal Monte et al., 2012; Keane et al., 2002), and our findings are 
consistent with the notion that there may be regions in which damage differentially affects 
recognition of anger (see also, e.g., Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003). 
Possible common areas 
We also found evidence of areas in which combined accuracy across all three threat emotions 
was significantly related to the integrity of grey matter tissue. Damage to areas of the left 
inferior temporal and right superior frontal cortices correlated significantly with combined 
accuracy for fear, anger and disgust. Whilst a similar left temporal area was also associated 
with anger accuracy (prior to masking out the effects of the other emotions), this disappeared 
after contrast masking, suggesting that the association for anger at this location was not 
reliably greater than for the other two emotions. The contributions of both anger and fear 
(although not disgust) are reliably above zero at the peak of this cluster (Figure 8c). 
A similar area of right superior frontal gyrus, significant for the mean overall analysis, was also 
found to be correlated with accuracy for anger. However, this again did not remain after 
contrast masking, suggesting that the association was not significantly greater than for the 
other two emotions. As shown in Figure 8d, the predictive contribution of both disgust and 
anger (but not fear) were reliably above zero at the peak of this cluster.  
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Thus, there were brain areas in which damage was associated with accuracy for at least two of 
the three emotions. Again, the anatomical location of these areas may be broadly 
commensurate with certain previous research. Lesions to numerous frontal regions have been 
associated with impaired ability to recognise facial emotion (e.g., Keane et al., 2002). The 
inferior temporal cortex has long been associated with representations of visual stimuli (e.g., 
Gauthier et al., 1996), and the anterior temporal lobe has been thought to have a role in 
various emotional capacities (see, e.g., Olson, Plotzker & Ezzyat, 2007). The fusiform gyrus has 
a well-established link with the processing of faces, although is generally less implicated in 
varying aspects such as expression (e.g., Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). It is interesting 
that our data indicate an association between left temporal lobe abnormalities and emotion 
recognition deficits – it has frequently been the right side which has been associated with 
linking higher-level visual representations (such as faces) with emotions, and the left more 
with semantic knowledge (e.g., Snowden, Thompson, & Neary, 2004). 
Overall, the data from this study add to a position that recognition of the three “threat” 
emotions – anger, disgust and fear – may involve both shared and separate neural substrates. 
The existence of distinct areas which are specifically important to the recognition of each of 
these three emotions is consistent with distinct representations of these emotions in the brain. 
This may then support the existence of separate categories of emotion (e.g., Ekman, 1972; 
1992). The areas in which damage correlates with more than one emotion challenge the 
discrete category model. However, a categorical account may allow for some overlap in the 
(also partially distinct) neural substrates. It should also be noted that the common areas in our 
study may correspond to any stage in the process of facial emotion recognition. Whilst we 
include picture naming as a covariate, to partially control for lower-level perception and 
higher-level linguistic processes, there may still be processing stages not accounted for in the 
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design which are not specific to facial emotion recognition. It is conceivable, for example, that 
the common areas in temporal cortex correspond to areas particularly crucial to the 
perception of (even non-emotional) faces (see, e.g., Haxby et al., 2003). Inclusion of non-
emotional face-processing tasks (e.g., identity-based tasks) as covariates may provide a better 
control for these factors in future studies.  
A strictly dimensional position, on the other hand, would easily account for the presence of 
shared areas. However, it may struggle to explain the existence of distinct regions to which 
damage specifically impacts on the detection of fear, anger and disgust. The degree to which 
our data may be consistent with a dimensional view of emotion representation is worth brief 
exploration. Emotions may be considered dimensional or categorical at different levels. 
Arguably, it does not necessarily follow that people’s behaviour being consistent with 
categories of emotion (e.g., categorical perception effects, Young et al., 1997) means that 
these categories are represented by anatomically distinct substrates. Similarly, a dimensional 
representation at some level may not preclude the possibility of partially distinct neural 
circuitry for prototypical disgust, anger and fear: there is no consensus on the manner in which 
psychological dimensions such as valence or arousal (e.g., Russell, 2003) may be represented 
neurally (although see, e.g., Adolphs et al., 1999; Anders, Lotze, Erb, Grodd, & Birbaumer, 
2004; Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd, 2007). However, in addition, specific impairment of the 
recognition of different emotions may be possible even under a dimensional view which 
assumes that the same brain areas subserve perception of all emotions. If the same neural 
circuitry recognises all emotions, one might still expect activation differences in response to 
different emotions on functional brain imaging (different levels on a dimension perhaps being 
represented by different patterns of activation across the same brain regions) (e.g., Grimm et 
al., 2006). Would this allow that damage to specific regions specifically impairs perception of 
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different emotions (as our data suggest)? Imagine that an area crucial to the assessment of a 
dimension, say arousal, is removed. There might then be an impairment of the ability to assess 
arousal in all emotional stimuli; at its most extreme this would essentially remove the 
dimension from emotion descriptions, reducing the dimensionality of emotion space. It might 
be difficult to identify many emotions, but especially those which have close neighbours on the 
remaining dimension(s) (e.g., valence). Among the six linguistic categories represented by the 
“basic” emotions, recognition of prototypical happiness may be relatively preserved due to its 
relative isolation in highly positive valence. But in the absence of this area, what might be 
assumed by the rest of the brain? Suppose that this loss leads to a state commensurate with 
constantly low arousal. In this case, fear (high arousal) may be difficult to detect whereas 
sadness (low arousal) may be identified accurately (perhaps over-identified). Under this 
(hypothetical) model, it’s also possible that removal of a different area of the arousal detection 
circuit would lead to the dimension becoming “stuck” at a different level; high arousal, say.  
Then the opposite pattern may occur – fear could be more frequently correctly recognised 
than sadness. As discussed in the introduction, there have been suggestions that damage to 
different areas specifically impairs the recognition of unpleasant or pleasant emotions (e.g., 
Adolphs et al., 2001; Dal Monte et al., 2012).However, for a dimensional account to 
accommodate our data – differences in the brain regions required for the accurate 
identification of anger, disgust and fear (all negative in valence, and relatively high in arousal) –
more fine-grained distinctions between levels on the dimensions may be required at the level 
of brain circuitry. For some, this may raise questions about the level at which emotion could be 
said to be a dimensional construct.  
It is worth noting that, when using techniques such as VBM, the power to detect a region 
which is important to a behavioural outcome is entirely dependent on variation in voxel 
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integrity in this region. If there are no participants with lesions to an area (and thus no 
variance in voxel values), there will be no correlations to this area, no matter how crucial to the 
particular task. Within our study, whilst there is reasonable variation in lesion location, the 
sample is fairly small. In addition, some of the regions highlighted by our analysis were small, 
and are in need of replication. Use of a larger sample would allow more confident delineation 
of which specific areas are and are not necessary for recognition of the different emotions. 
Tissue integrity of certain areas which have frequently been associated with fear, anger or 
disgust recognition in previous studies (e.g., the amygdala; basal ganglia; see introduction) was 
not found to correlate with accuracy in the current study. Of these, perhaps the lack of 
association of amygdala damage with fear (or general threat emotion) recognition (despite 
lesions covering the amygdala bilaterally) is most striking. It has been found (e.g., Rotshtein et 
al., 2010) that unilateral amygdala damage may not cause impairment in explicit fear 
recognition, and it may be that bilateral damage is not a feature of our sample. It is, of course, 
also difficult to conclude much from a null result such as this, particularly in a relatively small 
sample.  
Another assumption of VBM is that of a linear relationship between tissue integrity and 
assessed behavioural impairment severity. Implications of this may be particularly complex in 
the context of the neural representation of psychological dimensions (see above): there may 
be many different (and potentially non-linear) ways in which removal of part of a “dimension” 
circuit could exert effects for the different emotions. In addition, a one-to-one mapping 
between lesions and functions is assumed by VBM, and it is assumed that across individuals, 
similar brain structures subserve the same function.  Inconsistencies between VBM results and 
those found when assessing specific patients may reflect fallacies in this latter assumption. 
However, the considerable advantages of VBM – that it provides a method by which to assess 
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structure-function correspondence in a relatively unbiased manner across a sample with 
diverse lesions – mean that such studies have the potential to help address the discrepancies 
between studies of patients in whom circumscribed lesions have been visually described. In 
this case, our VBM analysis adds to a position that there are statistical regularities between the 
anatomical distribution of brain lesions and the detection of the three facial threat emotions, 
and that both common and distinct regions may characterise this association. This raises 
questions for any position which holds that emotions are represented entirely dimensionally, 
or entirely categorically, in the brain. 
Understanding the implications of different types of brain damage for the recognition of 
emotion in other people (and perhaps oneself; e.g., Goldman & Sripada, 2005) has direct 
applications clinically in brain injured populations. More broadly, though, the manner in which 
our representations of emotional states relate to one another has potential implications for 
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Public Briefing Document 
 
The ability to recognise the emotions displayed on other people’s faces is crucial to normal 
social interaction. It can also provide important clues about events in the environment, such as 
the presence of threats. For instance, to see someone else looked scared might warn us of the 
approach of a dangerous animal. There are six facial expressions which are often considered 
“basic”, and which may be recognised similarly across cultures (e.g., Ekman, 1971; Ekman, 
1973). These are anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise.  
In certain clinical populations, the ability to process facial expression in others is compromised. 
For example, Harms et al. (2010) reviewed numerous papers on the ability of people with 
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) to process facial emotions, and confirmed evidence of 
atypicalities. These atypicalities may relate to some of the clinical features of ASD, such as 
difficulties with social functioning.  
In this thesis, I have considered some clinical populations in which facial emotion processing 
may be impaired.  
In the Literature Review, I assess possible impairments in facial emotion processing in people 
with genetic syndromes which affect social and/or cognitive development (genetic 
neurodevelopmental syndromes). Specifically, I looked at the evidence for atypical facial 
emotion processing in genetic neurodevelopmental syndromes associated with an increased 
likelihood of diagnosis of ASD (e.g., Moss & Howlin, 2009). The literature review asks what is 
known about facial emotion processing in these syndromes, and how it might inform us about 
the relationship of the syndromes with ASD.  
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A literature search was conducted for papers empirically assessing facial emotion processing in 
each of the five syndromes most frequently associated with ASD in the research literature 
(Moss & Howlin, 2009): Fragile X Syndrome (FXS), Tuberous Sclerosis Complex, Rett Syndrome, 
Down Syndrome (DS) and Phenylketonuria. Of these, studies were found, and reviewed, for DS 
and FXS. In DS, there is evidence of possible reduced accuracy, in relation to typically 
developing children of matched intellectual ability, in facial emotion processing tasks (e.g., 
requiring people to match faces by their emotion). However, this may be subtle, and the 
nature of the deficit is not clear. In FXS, there is no evidence of reduced accuracy in such tasks, 
but studies using eye tracking, pupillometry, and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI) indicate atypicalities in emotion processing. Possible implications of these findings for 
the association of ASD in these syndromes are discussed, along with possible future research 
directions.  
In the empirical paper, we assessed the recognition of basic facial emotions associated with 
threat – anger, fear and disgust – in 26 people with brain damage from different causes (e.g., 
stroke, carbon monoxide poisoning). These people’s brain injuries were chronic (happened 
more than 12 months ago) and stable. We compared the performance of this patient group 
with that of normal healthy participants of similar ages, on tasks requiring people to identify 
the expression displayed on photographs of faces (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). We found that the 
patient group performed more poorly on recognition of all 3 of the “threat” emotions. 
For the 26 patients, we also assessed the relationship between emotion recognition accuracy 
and the anatomical distribution of brain damage. We used these data to inform a debate about 
how emotions are processed. Whilst fear, anger or disgust in the face of another person all 
alert the observer to the presence of possible threat, the relationship between the processing 
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of these emotions is debated: there is no consensus on whether they are represented 
categorically (e.g., Ekman, 1971) or dimensionally (e.g., Russell, 1980).  
Under the categorical model, it is postulated that each of the “basic” emotions not only has its 
own evolutionary history and physiology, but corresponds to a relatively specific facial 
configuration, perceived reliably and similarly across cultures (e.g., Ekman, 1973). Conversely, 
the two-dimensional hypothesis postulates no qualitative distinction between emotion 
categories, instead advocating that specific emotional states fall at specific points in a 
continuous emotional space defined by two orthogonal dimensions: i) valence, the subjective 
experience of the affect, which varies in its pleasantness, and ii) arousal, the degree to which 
an emotion is calm or excitatory (Russell, 1980).Whilst the emotional states linked with labels 
of fear, anger and disgust are all negative in valence and associated with relatively high arousal, 
there are differences, such as that lower arousal may be associated with disgust than with fear 
or anger (e.g., Adolphs, Russell, & Tranel, 1999).  Differences in arousal and valence associated 
with different emotional states may be consistent with, for instance, autonomic arousal 
differences on viewing faces displaying different emotions (Johnsen, Thayer, & Hugdahl, 1995). 
The discrete category and two-dimensional models are associated with different predictions 
about the localization of emotional processing in the brain. The discrete category hypothesis 
predicts a qualitative neural dissociation across emotions, with different brain areas associated 
with different emotional categories. On the other hand, the bi-dimensional account of 
emotions predicts that similar brain regions will be involved in processing all emotional states, 
with quantitative differences across emotions.  Neuropsychological (as well as neuroimaging) 
data have to date provided inconclusive evidence to distinguish between these hypotheses. 
Whilst certain brain regions have been shown consistently to be involved in emotional 
processing, their emotional specificity is debated. The amygdala, insula and basal ganglia, as 
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well as areas of frontal and parietal cortex, are among the brain regions which have 
consistently been linked to the processing of facial anger, disgust or fear. However, whilst in 
some studies each of these regions has been associated specifically with impairment in the 
recognition of one or another of the threat emotions, other findings indicate a more general 
involvement in facial emotion processing.  
In the group of 26 patients, we used voxel-based morphometry (VBM) (Ashburner & Friston, 
2000), a statistical technique to assess in an unbiased fashion the relationship between 
anatomical brain variations and behavioural variables, to relate information from the patients’ 
brain scans to recognition accuracy for fear, anger and disgust. We found evidence to support 
both categorical and dimensional hypotheses of emotion representation: some brain areas 
were associated specifically with recognition of anger, fear or disgust, and some were 
associated with accuracy of recognition on all three emotions. Our data may present issues for 
any position maintaining that emotions are represented entirely categorically, or entirely 
dimensionally, within the brain. 
Understanding the implications of different types of brain damage for the recognition of 
emotion in other people has direct applications clinically in brain injured populations. More 
broadly, though, the manner in which our representations of emotional states relate to one 
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